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ABSTRACT
Hukou Decentralization and Migrant Students’ Educational
Opportunities: Case Studies in Beijing and Shenzhen, China
by
LI Bo
Master of Philosophy
Since the 1980s, ongoing reforms in China’s hukou system have drawn increasing
attention from various parties, and a consensus generated during the reform period
refers to decentralization practices. This research, with reference to new class and
social class theories, investigates how social policies alongside decentralization of
administration within the hukou system in Beijing and Shenzhen impact on
educational opportunities for migrant students. Based on a total of 29 in-depth
interviews conducted in these two cities, this research details the differentiation of
decentralization practices and influences from two perspectives: 1) financing in
private education; and 2) regulation in public education. In terms of financing, the
paucity of subsidy policies and additional sponsorship expenses worsen the
educational context and prospect for migrant students in Beijing. Comparatively, the
Shenzhen government has made and implemented a set of welcomed subsidy policies
for migrant students who receive private education, which financially dismantles
separation between public and private education and equalizes educational
opportunities for migrant students in the megacity. In terms of regulation, accessing
public education through hukou conversion is more practicable for migrant students
in Shenzhen than Beijing. Nonetheless, homeownership has emerged as an
increasingly overweight reference metric in public education access in Shenzhen,
which undermines egalitarian policy intentions and effects in hukou conversion
practices. With reference to the analysis of the interview transcripts, this research
concludes that migrant students are confronted with different inequality of
educational opportunities in these two cities, despite the fact that both subnational
governments have fully carried through hukou decentralization that has been deemed
as an effectively administrative approach to equalize public services delivery, such as
basic education.
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Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION
This research discusses local policies conceived amid decentralization reforms in
China’s hukou system, and examines the effectiveness of these policies in equalizing
educational opportunities for migrant students1 in Beijing and Shenzhen. This chapter,
as the outset of the thesis, is shaped by four areas of discussions. First, the research
background indicates the importance and reasons for this research by sketching the
reforms in the hukou system and educational inequality among migrant students as
well as presenting policy contexts that influence migrant students’ educational
opportunities in these two cities. Second, reflections over critical issues regarding the
research theme form into research inquiries and underlays the formation of informed
research questions. Third, the objectives and questions showcase the expectations of
this research. Fourth, the structure of the thesis is presented.
1.1 Research Background
Amid economic prosperity and ongoing urbanization in the People’s Republic of
China (China hereinafter), internal migration in the country has become a headline
issue in dozens of social affairs, which brings about not only demand for sufficient
labor force to immigrant places but presents associated emerging challenges of social
administration to subnational governments. First and foremost, a prominent public
debate in the nation’s educational field refers to inequality for migrant students.
Regarding the driving forces of the existence of inequality, China’s hukou system has
been a fundamentally institutional barrier making a difference ( Montgomery, 2012).
To minimize the negative impacts of the hukou system, the Chinese government
has launched policy initiatives to reshape its function. Since 1984, the hukou system
has been undergoing underlying reforms and gradually bereft of certain connotations
with highly power-centralized characteristics (Montgomery, 2012; Wu, 2013). Prior
to the new millennium, a modern hukou system was gradually established as a result
of dilapidation of all-roundly state-controlled commercial and industrial framework

1

Migrant students: referring to schoolchildren for compulsory education in the thesis.
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(Cheng & Selden, 1994). Since 2000, alongside the reduction of centralized
economic and social pattern, the hukou system has been “increasingly out of touch
with the country’s sociopolitical structure”, despite the fact that it plays “a significant
and sensible role in controlling the mobility of migration” and exerts a far-reaching
influence over an extensive range of social affairs (Montgomery, 2012, p.592).
1.1.1 Decentralization Effectiveness Debate
Researchers seeking to expose the distinguishable features of the reforms in the
hukou system summarize that China’ hukou reforms characterize decentralization
(e.g. Chan, 2010; Chan & Buckingham, 2008; Li, Li & Chen, 2010; Montgomery,
2012; Wu, 2013). The decentralization changes have reached a wide spectrum of
public governance including financial, administrative and economic paradigms, and
Chinese subnational governments started to be involved in policymaking associated
with social administration under the profound influence of the decentralized hukou
system (Wu, 2013). Unanimously, these reforms with decentralized traits implies
economic reforms of the country since the “open-door” policy commencement,
which has been featured with a decentralized mode(Jin & Zou, 2005).
In the literature, the question has been debated for years regarding whether
decentralization is a panacea that assures institutional policies precisely reflect
preferences of localities in terms of providing adequate and appropriate public
services through efficient, effective and equal distributive mechanisms. Traditional
theorists such as Hayek (1945) and Musgrave (1959) assume that decentralization
could bring local governments much closer to the public and make public officials
more sensitive to needs of local residents. By contrast, a growing number of studies
have indicated that decentralization cannot help local governments to achieve the
said goals. Due to the diversity concerning funding capacity, technical expertise and
management professionalism, developing are incapable of undertaking decentralized
tasks and therefore become marginalized in the process (Rondinelli, McCullough &
Johnson, 1989; Stepan, 2000).
In terms of these three capacities, neither Beijing nor Shenzhen is equivalent to
2

an “developing region”. So how do we understand the decentralization effectiveness
in these two cities? This general inquiry makes this research unique by bridging the
literature debate with the research contexts that are not developing regions. In the
meantime, decentralization strategies are implemented through making and
conducting policies, so a review of policy contexts is the prerequisite to discuss the
decentralization effectiveness in these two cities
1.1.2 Policy Contexts in the Research Sites
Beijing, as the capital of the country, tops development and modernization due to
its political superiority and particularity. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the
capital city has surpassed three trillion yuan by 2019 (Beijing Municipal Bureau of
Statistics, 2019). As a result, the inputs of educational resources from the government
have also increased. With reference to the latest statistical report, the number of basic
educational practitioners in the city was 462,000, an 3.5 per cent increase compared
with 2018 (Beijing Municipal Bureau of Statistics, 2019). Also, due to reurbanization
and reconstruction of non-capital functional zones, the number of permanent
residents has decreased since 2010 in the city (Beijing Municipal Bureau of Statistics,
2019). This is a result of the government starting to constrain hukou conversion
practices by reducing the frequency of the issuance of temporary residential permits
(Beijing Municipal Government, 2016, 2018).
Generally, there are two ways for non-local residents in the capital to access
compulsory education, the one is hukou conversion practices, and the other is private
education. The hukou conversion is managed by the government, while private
education exclusively relates to the financial capacity of families. Owing to its higher
expenses, the majority of migrant residents are unwilling to consider private
education unless government assistance is provided (Montgomery, 2012; Wu, 2011)
The economic performance of the other research site, Shenzhen 2, is impressive
as ever. As of the end of 2018, the GDP of the city was marked with 2.6 trillion yuan
Shenzhen - China’s first special economic zone (SEZ hereinafter): proposed by Xi Zhongxun
and designed by Deng Xiaoping in the 1970s and established since the 1980s (Publicity
Department of Shenzhen, 2018).
3
2

(Statistics Bureau of Guangdong Province, 2019). The economic rise tops the nation
ranking in the corresponding period. Shenzhen’s prominent role in Chinese economic
modernization, alongside a civilized life style, attracts people across the country.
Compared to 2017, Shenzhen’s permanent residents increased by 3.9 per cent in
2018 and reached over 13 million (Statistics Bureau of Shenzhen Municipality,
2019).
In accordance with ongoing development, the Shenzhen government underlines
the priority and consistency of human capital and labor force, which can be indicated
in its blueprint for developing compulsory education. The number of primary schools
of the city has reached 206,327 in 2018, increasing by 13.7 per cent compared to
2017 (Statistics Bureau of Shenzhen Municipality, 2019). At the same period, the
number of regular secondary schools increased by 7.6 per cent and grew up to
164,088 (Statistics Bureau of Shenzhen Municipality, 2019).
However, the prospect and present situation of accessing education by migrant
students in China remain dimmed. In 2016, the “Blue Book on Educational Poverty
Alleviation” pointed six aspects that need to be meliorated for bettering off the
educational system of the country, including lagging schooling qualities and
conditions, an unbalanced

educational development

structure, educational

embarrassment and unreachablity for the poor, out-of-date educational ideas and
techniques in developing regions, and a wonky substratum in compulsory education
system (Beijing Normal University, 2016). The rationality of developing basic
education in the country has been altered from creating an egalitarian system that
was prevalent before 1978 into a meritocratic paradigm formulated alongside the
economic prosperity in the four decades, which can be viewed a historical derivative
derivative of the national development proposal on the “four modernizations”3 (sige
xiandaihua) (Li, 2003).
With reference to the disputes in the literature and economical and educational
“Four modernizations”: a national development strategy in China, proposed in the First National
People’s Congress (December 1964), and referring to industry, agriculture, national defence, and
science and technology that need to be modernized by end of the 20th century..
3
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developments of these two cities in China, it is imperative to understand the present
situation

of

educational

opportunities

for

migrant

students amid

hukou

decentralization as this expedites policy programmings that influence the creation of
an equal educational system. A comparative analysis can testify systematically the de
facto confounding factors impacting on education equalization in Chinese cities.
The theoretical focus of this research derives from the literature debate over the
decentralization effectiveness. Theorists argue that effectiveness of decentralization
can be differentiated in different regions as the differentiation of governing capacities
including personal, fiscal and other critical components in public administration (e.g.
Rondinelli, McCullough & Johnson, 1989; Stepan, 2000). This present comparative
social policy study, taking account of this debate and referring to decentralization of
hukou system, is to exam policy effects amid hukou decentralization in equalizing
compulsory educational opportunities for migrant students in two developed Chinese
cities. The theoretical importance of this research is to test the literature debate on
decentralization effectiveness. Specifically, whether developed regions are likely to
produce effective policies to distribute public services and perform well in social
administration including education.
1.2 Problem Statement and the Research Gap
The hukou system has received extensive discussion and criticisms concerning
the relative equality of its implementation (Chan, 2009; Chan & Zhang, 1999;
Solinger, 1999; Wang, 2005). In the field of educational practices, the major debate
regarding the hukou system and its influence is associated with migrants as the
system institutionally creates an invisible wall dividing urban and rural, local and
non-local citizens in accessing educational services (Chan & Buckingham, 2008). As
a constitution-guarding entity, the Chinese government is committed to actualizing
“compulsory education equalization” (yiwu jiaoyu jundeng hua), which is an
underlying “public welfare” for the all citizens (Standing Committee of the National
People’s Congress, 2018).
Alongside economic and social development, the hukou system has experienced
5

a series of decentralized reforms that allow local governments to exercise discretion
over specific regulations and policies within the system. However, the fact is that the
case of China is extremely complicated to establish a universal context for
educational attainment equalization due to cultural, demographic, geographic and
economic diversities within the country (Montgomery, 2012). Furthermore, as a
result, the feeling of mistreatment in education is expanded among migrants in China
(Montgomery, 2012).
In terms of the research sites, Beijing and Shenzhen, both are first tire cities4 and
attract large numbers of migrants. Accordingly, how can we understand the two
cities’ decentralized hukou reforms? Do these decentralized reforms favor or further
marginalize migrants in terms of accessing compulsory education? Are there
“rivalries” between non-local and local residents in terms of compulsory education
attainment? These inquiries have not been analyzed well in the literature, particularly
from a comparative perspective, and certainly deserve further investigations. In what
follows, research objectives are presented and informed the research questions.
1.3 Research Objective and Questions
In light of the background discourse and the reflections based on the criticisms
as well as the inductive inquiries, the research objective of this study is to understand
how hukou decentralization impacts on educational opportunities for migrant
students in Beijing and Shenzhen, China.
With reference to the theoretical debate on decentralization effectiveness and the
research objective, this research aims to answer the following questions:
1) under the context of hukou decentralization, what are policies conceived by
the local governments to manage educational opportunities for migrant students in
Beijing and Shenzhen; and
2)

how effective these policies are in equalizing educational opportunities for

migrant students in these two cities?
Four first-tire cities in China: Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen. The city-ranking
list majorly refers to the business-doing-environment criteria and covers 338 prefecture-level
cities in mainland China which has been classified into six different cohorts (China Daily, 2019).
6
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This research proceeds from the comparative perspective of analysis, of which
the second research question, represented as the primary study inquiry, embodies the
theoretical interest that is to examine the literature debate over the effectiveness of
decentralization in developed regions. From a theoretical perspective, the second
research question echoes the literature debate by referring to the policies conceived
by these two local governments in hukou decentralization. By investigating
educational inequality among migrant students in these two cities, this study provides
a new understanding from a comparative perspective on decentralization practices in
the hukou system.
This research used the method of case study for analysis. Specifically, in-depth
interview was employed for data collection, After fieldwork, the data collected were
qualitatively analyzed by the software of NVivo and the details of the research deign
are expounded in the Chapter 4.
1.4 Structure of the Thesis
This thesis comprises six parts. The first chapter is an introduction showing the
researching overview, including background, problem statement, the research gap
and objective as well as questions, and the presentation of the structure of this thesis.
The second chapter refers to the background discourses concerning the research
theme and introduces critical issues concerned. The third chapter, consisting of the
literature review, conceptualization of thematic terms and conceptual framework,
presents the rationale for conducting this research. The fourth chapter details the
research design, including methodological perspectives, fieldwork sites, sampling,
data collection, analysis and validity, and ethical issues. The fifth chapter presents the
findings and critical discussions by linking the findings with the research questions
and conceptual framework. The sixth chapter concludes the thesis by indicating
contributions and limitations of this research as well as future research plans. The
following chapter considers the present context of decentralization reforms in the
hukou system and educational inequality in these two cities, which is an extension of
the discussion of the research inquiries and interests.
7

Chapter 2 BACKGROUND
The major objective of this chapter is to discuss the policy contexts within the
decentralized reforms in the hukou system, and to expound the relationship between
the hukou system and educational inequality. The structure of this chapter is formed
by two parts. First, hukou reforms are reviewed from a historically decentralized
perspective. Second, under the impact of the hukou system, educational inequality
among migrant students in these two research sites are discussed.
2.1 The Hukou System and Its Decentralization Reforms
This section details the thematic term: hukou, including its conception, functions
and reforms. By reviewing these essentials, the discoursing basis is formed, which
sustains discussion on critical issues regarding educational inequality.
2.1.1 The Hukou System and Its Basic Function
The hukou system, known as huji or household registration system, is an integral
of amassing information of population and provides the principal basis of personal
residential records including, but not limited to, citizenship, religious, marriage,
education and military services. The hukou system is viewed as the domestic
passport and few Chinese residents dispute its significance in affecting lives (Chan &
Zhang, 1999; Cheng & Seiden, 1994). As a nationwide administrative regime, the
hukou system is the fate determinant for the Chinese residents in accessing public
services including medicare, education, employment and housing (Chan & Zhang,
1999). Concerning the study theme, the hukou system can be viewed as the basis of
inducting educational inequality for different social groups by classifying residents
into urban and rural, local and non-local (Fu & Ren, 2010).
As Chapter 1 discussed, the hukou system is a pivotal political institution that
documents population and steers distributive mechanisms of public resources (Cheng
& Selden, 1994; Wu, 2013). To rewind its originality, it is imperative to glance over
its historical process on evolution after Communist Party of China (CPC hereinafter)
seized power since 1949.
8

Throughout the first decade of the new born political regime, CPC implemented
loads of laws, programs and regulations to reshape the state governance and to make
institutional preparations to national revitalization (Cheng & Selden, 1994). Along
with these political innovations, the hukou system had been eventually established in
1958 (Cheng & Selden, 1994; Wang, 2005; Wu, 2013). In the beginning, collecting
demographic information was the initial purpose of promulgating and implementing
the hukou system. Before the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of
CPC in 1978, the hukou system had been rarely scrutinized and thus irritated spatial
hierarchies in the society, which particularly positioned villagers in a solo-trapped
situation (Cheng & Selden, 1994). As Banister (1987) noted, in terms of accessing
social services, the rural residents had none of rights to be treated and served as equal
as their urban counterparts who were prioritized on the chain of social services
provision. For the rural residents, this inequality was longstanding before the 1980s
and organically influenced the fates of these people in their futures (Chan & Zhang,
1999; Ren, Tian, Huang & Li, 1996).
The situation filled with the inactive and stubborn domestic migration has been
started to change since 1978, alongside the initiative of the economic opening-up and
reforms. In order to solve the domestic impasses and imply with the changes in the
economy, the Chinese government started to launch reforms in political institutions.
The hukou system, accordingly, opened a new chapter with decentralization practices,
which became a hackneyed political expression extensively in bureaucratic groups.
2.1.2 Hukou Decentralization and Its Impact
Hukou reforms with decentralization features reportedly started in the mid 1980s
and were launched substantive experiments after 1990. The initial reforms aimed to
integrate the certain selective groups of rural residents into urban residents by giving
them a local urban hukou status (Wu, 2013). This filtered process selected some rural
residents and made them eligible to settle down in urban areas where they had either
official employments or apartments (State Council, 1984). Meanwhile, the Ministry
of Public Security, which has been the representative of the central government in
9

terms of managing population, promulgated a regulation for the reported quotas of
rural-urban hukou transitions (nongzhuanfei) on a year basis (Ministry of Public
Security, 1985). This document demonstrated that the Chinese government initiated a
top-down administration in the hukou system, which was reflected by the role change
for the central government that therefrom had become an instructor rather than a
practitioner for hukou management (Ministry of Public Security, 1985).
Massive decentralization reforms took place in the hukou system were happened
since the 1990s when the country gradually stepped into a golden era of economic
growth. Particularly, when approaching the new millennium, the role of the central
government, as an instructor, made a consistent difference in many aspects of the
hukou system and population management. Migrants those who have stable incomes
and properties and been residing for certain periods of years in small cities or towns
were eligible to change hukou status into local urban hukou, and these cities or towns
were chosen as the pilot sites for this program (State Council & Ministry of Public
Security, 1997). In 1998, another reportedly official document was issued and
indicated that family members of these eligible migrants were also applicable to
change non-local hukou so long as they met particular requirements set by the local
governments (State Council & Ministry of Public Security, 1998). This declaration
further demonstrates that local governments in China started to be in charge of local
hukou management practices, and therefore 1998 is regarded as a milestone in terms
of decentralization practices in the hukou system.
When walking into the 21st century, the Chinese government has issued plenty
of political regulations and laws that aim to persistently promote hukou reforms. In
this period, what deserves extra attention is that these endeavors essentially response
the fact of social and economic transformations. In 2001, the central government
decided to cancel the fixed quotas for transforming the hukou status that targeted at
those moving into urban areas from villages and counties (State Council & Ministry
of Public Security, 2001). As a result, many local governments of the country have
started to launch varies types of policies and regulations to better off management
10

practices associated with the hukou system. One of prevalent strategies used to be the
introduction of the “blue-stamped” hukou (lanyin hukou) (Wu, 2013). This type of
hukou which is basically different from the official “red-stamped” hukou (hongyin
hukou) has been universally used as a strategy by local governments to control the
migrant population and manage hukou conversion (Wu, 2013). However, the
“blue-stamped” hukou has been criticized due to its discrimination against the
holders in terms of the access for social services (Cao, 2001; Wu, 2013). The reason
is that because the “blue-stamped” hukou was originally proposed for boosting the
market of commercial real estate in cities. Also, what was complained is that local
governments used it to increase local revenues by selling quotas of “blue-stamped”
hukou (Wu, 2013, Zhang, 2012). Therefore, the “blue-stamped” hukou has been
abandoned by local governments since the beginning of the 2000s.
For the sake of further modernizing the economic structure, promoting
urbanization and integrating the rural and urban civilization, the State Council (2014)
issued a document that comprises a bunch of policy initiatives and aims to officially
desert the “dualism pattern”5 in the hukou system, which was supposed to benefit
hundreds and thousands of migrants in the country. Unsurprisingly, this document
further emphasizes the importance of local diversities which need to be concerned as
one of the principles, and highlights that local governments are at the frontier to
design and implement proper programs to satiate migrants in terms of transforming
hukou status and ensure them with equal rights to access social services (State
Council, 2014). It is argued that the central government and local governments are
committed to addressing inequality issues within the hukou system since 2014. The
officials even have decided to abrogate the difference between rural and urban in
many aspects that was still perplexing migrants due to limited underlying changes in

“Dualism pattern” in the hukou system: there are two types of hukou designed by the Chinese
government, the one is urban or non-agricultural hukou which has been registered by residents
who are born and living in cities and towns; the other one is rural or agricultural hukou which has
been registered by residents who are born and living in counties and villages. These two types of
hukou cannot be changed without government approval (Chan, Liu & Yang, 1999; Qiu, 2015).
5
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the reforms (Chan & Buckingham, 2008; Li et al., 2010). This, in other words, could
be understood that it is still not possible to completely equalize the right of accessing
social services for migrants if the Chinese government had not abolished the hukou
system, although the “dualism patter” has been rescinded.

CENTRALIZATION
Before 1984
The hukou system
was highly centralized,
from its designs, functions, and changes
1984-1997
The major decentralized change in the hukou system:
Nong-zhuan-fei (rural being turned into urban hukou) policy;
Based on this policy, the central government started to
allowing local governments to design the eligible requirements
and was only in charge of the allocation quota
1997-2001
Further decentralized move in the nong-zhuang-fei policy,
the only role of the central government decided the allocation quota was abandoned,
so the local governments were enjoyed full-right to run in this matter
2001-2014
The hukou types were diversified, such as “blue-print” hukou, which implied with the
economic and urbanization development
After 2014
The dualism pattern (rural and urban hukou classification) was abandoned, and the “point-based”
system was implemented differently in different regions to tackle with migration issues
DECENTRALIZATION

Figure 2.1 The pyramid of hukou decentralization reforms.
Source: State Council (2014) and Wu (2013).

The figure 2.1 summarizes the milestones of the decentralization reforms in the
hukou system. The development trend is that local governments are given more
rooms and freedoms of making decisions on hukou administration changes according
to local circumstances. Alongside China’s urbanization, cities confront different
migration issues, including education, medicare and housing. These issues bring
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emerging challenges and tasks to local governments in social administration that is a
field deemed to be changed into the new normality (Wu, 2013). Accordingly, how to
balance the distribution of the social benefits between local and non-local residents
becomes a prominent task for subnational governments in China.
Regardless of the consequences, the process of hukou reforms has been viewed
as an ongoing decentralization process in governance, which implies with
administrative philosophy changes in Chinese political regime alongside the
economic development (Cai & Treisman, 2006; Montgomery, 2013; Wang, 2004; Wu,
2013). In the literature, there are decentralization proponents arguing that a
decentralized governance model can promote the degree of efficiency, effectiveness
and equality of social services delivery by bringing local governments closer to the
public (Hayek, 1945; Musgrave, 1959). Nevertheless, when taking into account of
educational attainments by migrant students in China and the influence of the hukou
system, the inequality in education seems to remain unchanged to non-local students.
In what follows, educational inequality in these two cities is reviewed. By doing
so, the section thus expounds the impact of the hukou system on creating educational
inequality to migrant students and polarizing the educational context.
2.2 Educational Inequality and Challenges for Migrant Students
China’s hukou system incurs the negativeness to not only adult migrants but their
offspring in accessing social services in immigrant places. This is because that the
hukou registration keeps children whose parents are holding non-local hukou are
bound to register with same type of non-local hukou (Qiu, 2015). Accordingly, the
hukou system is one of political origins causing social stratification between local
and non-local residents, rural and urban residents, before 2014 when the “dualism
pattern” was abandoned (Potter & Potter, 1990; Woronov, 2004). In recent years, the
Chinese government has been dedicated to making compulsory education more
accessible for migrant students, which has been a political consensus among the
different layers of governments. Nevertheless, an completely equal educational
context remains a utopia for the large number of migrant families in urban China,
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although there is the national proposal on “compulsory education equalization”.
The All-China Women’s Federation (ACWF hereinafter) posted a survey in 2005
anticipating that the number of migrant students who were not accessible to the
decent compulsory education in Chinese cities would been increased steadily from
2005 till 2010 (ACWF, 2005; cited by the Sina News, 2005). Due to the influence of
the trend of increasing number of migrants, cities face emerging social administrative
challenges to satiate the new residents by providing adequate social services through
equal distributive mechanisms. Without doubt, the Chinese government has yet
acknowledged the imperative to actualize equalization of compulsory education and
made loads of constructive paper works over the last years. Education equality is
highlighted not only in the process of admitting migrant students but also in the
quality of providing educational services to the non-local (Qiu, 2015).
However, the concept of “mobility” that is associated with the inter-generational
influence between parents and children determines the tendency and opportunities of
educational attainment by students, which impairs policies because of institutional
barriers, which in China is revealed by the hukou system and its hereditary origin
(Knight, Sicular & Yue, 2011). This is parallel to what Cheng and Selden (1994), and
Mallee (2006) argue that a Chinese citizen’s hukou status is exclusively determined
by parents’ hukou status. Due to the inheritance, migrant students in China have been
struggling with compulsory educational attainment in cities where they moved into
with their parents. Previously, what has been found was that the rural hukou holders
would complete relatively fewer years of education (Liu, 2005). Heckman (2005)
indicates that government funding sources were largely allocated beyond compulsory
education and mainly supported post-secondary schools in urban areas. What makes
the situation even worse is that local governments need to tackle with issues related
to development of compulsory education by local revenues. However, due to rigidly
regional disparities in economies, there are a great number of local governments in
central and western China which cannot afford financial pressure. Thereby there was
a tendency that local governments started to tax migrants who were usually poorer
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than most of urban counterparts, so the “additional schooling fee” (jiedu fei) was
charged by non-local students in primary and junior high schools which, although,
were supposed to be free-in-charge (Xie, 2002).
The Chinese government indeed implements policies to solve negative impacts
on the matter. Generally, there are two approaches to change regulatory mechanisms
and equalize educational services. The first one is to incentivize national economic
growth, which is reflected on “GDP Per Capita”6 that has been dramatically increased
from 385 yuan in 1978 to 64,644 yuan in 2018 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2019).
According to Nee’s (1996) theoretical discussions regarding the relationship between
economic development and educational investment of families, the return to human
capital and education is likely to be increased in a more prosperous economic context.
In reality, earnings by Chinese to return to education has inputted around ten per cent
in 2003, which jumped from three per cent in 1988 (Liu, 2006). In 1980, the Chinese
government proposed to universalize primary education by the end of the 1980s and
implemented the “nine-year compulsory education” program afterwards (Tsui, 1997).
Accompanied with the Compulsory Education Law in 1986, school expansion was
employed as a national strategy in the mid 1990s. The school enrolment rate from the
national perspective, therefore, has yet been reached over 98 per cent in compulsory
education since the mid 1990s (Wu & Zhang, 2010).
Assisted by these two national development ideologies in education, whether the
country has been approaching the target of equalizing compulsory education in the
country? Whether Beijing and Shenzhen have established equal educational systems
for migrant students?
2.2.1 A Dimmed Situation in Beijing
With reference to the two macro-ideologies set by the Chinese government, first,

“GDP Per Capita” is calculated with reference to the unit of household, which refers to local
and non-local hukou residents in China. This calculating method is applied to “Per Capita
Disposable Income” included in the following parts as well (National Bureau of Statistics, 2019).
6
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it is imperative to trace “GDP Per Capita” in the capital over the last years.
According to the official report, “GDP Per Capita” in Beijing has been increased
from 2,836 yuan in 1986 to 144,991 yuan in 2018 (National Bureau of statistics,
Statistics, 2019). Currently, Beijing is the top-ranked provincial region in the country
except Hong Kong and Macao Special Administration Regions in terms of index of
“GDP Per Capita” (National Bureau of Statistics, 2019). Based upon the theoretical
argument on the “return to social capital” by Nee (1996), what can be assumed is that
residents in Beijing ought to have more options in education, either private or public
ones, compared with people living in other provinces. Another index apparently
showing the priority of accessing education by residents in Beijing is “Per Capita
Disposable Income” (PCDI). In 2018, the PCDI in China was averaged with 28,228
yuan while Beijing’s PCDI was 62,316 yuan, which was about two times higher than
the average national figure (National Bureau of Statistics, 2019). With reference to
the economic indexes, it seems that residents in Beijing should not concern much
about their children’s education.
Accessing compulsory education, however, does not exclusively depend on
wealth of families. Apart from private primary and secondary schools, all public
schools providing compulsory education in China have waived tuition fees including
“additional schooling fees” (jiedu fei) for non-local students (Ministry of Education,
2006). Compulsory educational attainment, hence, is much likely to be determined
by government regulations which are usually associated with resource distributions
(Woronov, 2004). So the other ideology of equalizing compulsory education, school
expansion, becomes more critical to mirror the situation of migrant students in terms
of accessing compulsory education in the city.
The number of primary schools in the capital was 984 by the end of 2018,
including 59 private schools which scantly accounts for nearly six per cent of the
main bulk of primary educational institutions (Beijing Municipal Government, 2018).
In terms of the number of junior high schools, excluding technical institutions, the
city has established 345 by the end of 2018 and only 27 of the schools were funded
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by non-government bodies (Beijing Municipal Government, 2018). In contrast,
surprisingly, there were 1,160 operational primary schools in Beijing serving its
residents a decade ago, which is a well-marked surplus compared to the up-to-date
figure, notwithstanding the amount of junior high schools counted with 342 was not
excessively distinct at the time (Beijing Municipal Bureau of Statistics, 2010).
Over the last decade, the non-local permanent population in Beijing that refers to
non-local hukou holders residing in the city consistently over six months touched on
7.94 million in the beginning of 2018 which jumped from 7.04 million by end of
2010 (Beijing Municipal Bureau of Statistics, 2018). Despite the growing trend of
non-local population has been altered and started to decline since 2016, the gross
amount of the social group keeps growth due to its colossal population denominator
(Sohu News, 2018). This certainly challenges the current mechanism of social
services provision by the local government. In basic educational provision. Non-local
hukou residents face an inclement situation for accessing compulsory education in
the capital. As what Qiu’s study on Beijing (2015) points, not only is it complex,
costly and cumbersome for migrants to tally with regulations in order to access local
public schools, but other educational options, including “migrant children schools”
(nongmingong zidi xuexiao) or private schools that could be notorious as “black” or
“underground” institutions with the poor quality of teaching. This results in negative
impacts on migrant students and has been criticized in literature (e.g. Kwong, 2004;
Liu, 2007; Wong, Chang & He, 2009; Zhao, 2008).
Undoubtedly, residents in Beijing become wealthier as a consequence of national
economic prosperity. However, due to the changing philosophy of urbanization of the
municipal government, basic educational resources become more scarce. Migrant
students are still trapped in a morass which lastingly procreates various roadblocks
for equalizing compulsory education.
2.2.2 Education-gaining Uncertainties in Shenzhen
Unlike rich discussions over educational inequality in Beijing in the literature,
Shenzhen, as coastal city with developed economic system in China, has been barely
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associated with educational issues among prior studies. Particularly, there is a
commonsense that Shenzhen is a frontier of integrating local and non-local residents
as a result of various local-level policies appealing for “Brain Gains”, exemplified by
the scheme of Thousand Talents Program (Publicity Department of Shenzhen, 2018).
The city’s openness and inclusiveness dilute negative impacts of the hukou system on
social services provision by outsiders. However, in terms of issues of educational
inequality, there are loads of news reporting the difficulty of accessing schools by
non-local hukou holders in Shenzhen (e.g. Sohu News, 2018).
In 1980, Shenzhen started to be constructed into a SEZ from a unenlightened
fishing village. At that time, “GDP Per Capita” of the region was 835 yuan (Statistics
Bureau of Shenzhen Municipality, 2019), As a consequence of national preferable
policies in economy, “GDP Per Capita” in Shenzhen has been elevated to 183,544
yuan by the end of 2017 (Statistics Bureau of Shenzhen Municipality, 2019).
Compared with Beijing’s GDP Per Capita in 2018, Shenzhen was reached 193.338
yuan which was apparently higher than the capital at the same time point (Statistics
Bureau of Guangdong Province, 2019). As to the index of PCDI in Shenzhen, the
figure was jumped from 1,915 yuan in 1985 to 52,938 yuan in 2017 (Statistics
Bureau of Shenzhen Municipality, 2019). Comparing to the national average figure
of PCDI which was jazzing around 20,000 yuan in recent years, Shenzhen performed
extremely well despite it was ruled out from the top-in-ranking at city-level across
the country. Alike Beijing, residents who are wealthier in Shenzhen ought to obtain
more options in children’s education.
Additionally, the number of schools providing basic education in the SEZ keeps
ascending. Before the establishment of SEZ, the number of primary schools in the
city was 226 in 1979, and 238 in 1980 respectively (Statistics Bureau of Shenzhen
Municipality, 2019). In 2017, the figure grew to 342 including public and private
schools (Statistics Bureau of Shenzhen Municipality, 2018). More perceptibly, the
amount of regular secondary schools in Shenzhen reached 368 in 2017, which,
compared to the number in 1979, increased more than ten times (Statistics Bureau of
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Shenzhen Municipality, 2019). Alongside the prosperity in economy and
development of civilization, it seems to be optimistic for residents in the city in terms
of opting for basic education. What makes particularly critical is that, unlike the
decreasing number of basic educational institutions in Beijing, residents in Shenzhen
not only became wealthier, but also factually were provided more choices to access
compulsory education due to the support of local policies for enlarging the scale of
schools.
Nevertheless, what makes some residents in Shenzhen distressed for accessing
compulsory education as reported by media could be the steadily increasing number
of residents with non-local hukou. By the end of 2018, according to the official report,
the number of permanent non-local hukou residents was 8.18 million, which accounts
for more than 65 per cent of total population of the city (Statistics Bureau of
Shenzhen Municipality, 2019). Comparing with the 2016 census, the annual average
growth rate (AAGR) of the permanent non-local hukou residents in Shenzhen was
25.4 per cent in 2018 (Statistics Bureau of Shenzhen Municipality, 2019). To recap
the changing momentum of non-local hukou residents, it is little disputable that the
AAGR has steadily increased since 1979. Therefore, the competition for accessing
compulsory education in Shenzhen often occurs not only between local and non-local
hukou students but also among migrants themselves. As a negative outcome, nearly
half of graduates of junior high schools in Shenzhen cannot enter into regular high
schools in 2018 due to an increasing number of non-local students who make the
competition intenser (Shenzhen Education Bureau, 2019).
In general, the two economic indicators, namely, “GDP Per Capita” and PCDI
evidence that residents in Beijing and Shenzhen became wealthier and obtained more
chance to access compulsory education over the last years. The momentum of school
expansion in Beijing, however, indicates that the government seems to intentionally
constrain the scale of basic educational settings which echoes the reurbanization near
the capital region. While the Shenzhen government maintains its desire of expanding
schools providing compulsory education, which works in concert with its opening-up
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economic system and a transforming social structure. Since both cities are first-tire,
the migratory population bases are large as a consequence of rapid urbanization of
the country. Migrant students, particularly those coming from lower social cohorts,
are in a position confronting intenser peer competitions not only with the natives but
within migrant communities. This makes the national appeal for “compulsory
education equalization” thanklessly and education inequality for migrant students
keeps drawing eyeballs and unstoppable critiques from stakeholders.

Beijing

Shenzhen

The Number of Immigrants
The Number of Schools
GDP Per Capita + PCDI
Competition Context

Local VS Non-local

Local + Non-local VS
Non-local

Figure 2.2 A summary of educational circumstances in the research sites.
Source: Beijing Municipal Bureau of Statistics (2019);
Statistics Bureau of Shenzhen Municipality (2018).

By taking into account of these influential factors on educational opportunities
for residents, the above figure generalizes these essentials after reviewing the policy
contexts and educational circumstances in these two cities and indicates the context
of “a dimmed situation” maintained in Beijing and of “education-gaining
uncertainties” rising in Shenzhen.
Although educational inequality is generated due to different social
circumstances in these two cities, one of the shared governing levers resulting in
educational inequality for migrant students is the hukou system, which produces
uncertainties thanks to its unpredictable reforms and changes (Zhao & Zhou, 2015).
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When facing the issue of disequilibrium of supply-demand in educational resources,
local governments utilize the “local-first” rule to practise admission in compulsory
education in China. “Local” or “non-local”, is categorized based on the standard,
hukou status. As aforementioned discussions, children’s hukou status derives from
parents, which indicates that non-local hukou parents pass their non-local hukou
status to children. In accordance with the “local-first” rule, non-local hukou students
have few options but have to wait in the back row for the compulsory education
admission, despite the proposal for “compulsory educational equalization” exists.
Based on the “return to social capital and education” argumentation, economic
advancement should equalize educational opportunities by offering more resources
and options in educational attainment, such as private education. However, China’s
private education, alike many other counterparts, requires nothing but financing
capacity of family. The private education cost can be an astronomical figure for the
majority of migrant families. To upper social class, regardless of hukou status, good
education has never been a concern. For grassroots families, however, accessing
public education is troubled in view of government policies of the “local-first”, while
choosing private education is likely to cause financial catastrophes, in spite of the
betterment in economic contexts. Accordingly, grassroots migrant students in the two
cities are trapped in terms of being admitted into compulsory education. Referring to
social status, it becomes more critical to investigate the effectiveness of policies amid
hukou decentralization by answering the question, whether policies conceived by the
two local governments equalize educational opportunities for migrant students?
Based on the fact-based discourse, it is believed that both institutional and social
indicators need to be examined to understand how decentralization reforms in the
hukou system affects educational opportunities for migrant students. Therefore, in the
following chapter, alongside the literature review that points the research lacunae, a
double-dimensional (social and policy context) conceptual framework is introduced
to theoretically link virtual contexts to scholarship, which is the researching basis for
empirically detailed explanations throughout the fieldwork.
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Chapter 3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF THE RESEARCH
The objective of this chapter is to circumstantiate the theoretical rationale of this
research. The structure of this chapter is shaped by a comprehensive literature review
that exposes the research gap and fixes the conceptualization of thematic terms, and
the conceptual framework of this research that is produced based on literature review
and pivots the analytical orientation and inducts the theoretical meaningfulness of
this research.
3.1 Review of Prior Studies
Investigation on the hukou system and its impact on educational inequality
among migrant students in China draw the spotlight in the academia. Prior to the 21st
century, the dualism of the system dividing residents into either rural or urban
originality has been headlined for analysis. Dozens of studies investigated social
issues as results of the dualism differentiation, migrants from rural regions,
particularly, have been leading characters on paper. Educational inequality of these
urban new residents, accordingly, is systematically discoursed, and the tendency has
yet been altered since the 21st century while the Chinese government started to relax
the hukou system (Ma & Wu, 2019). In the literature, there are two emblematically
manners adopted for explaining the hukou system and its impact on education
inequality among migrant students in China, one used to regard the hukou system as
an institutional barrier that is stubborn and exclusively subject to political orders (e.g.
Goodburn, 2009; Woronov, 2004); and the other explanation is based on the social
capital theory that comes from sociological standpoints (e.g. Coleman, 1988). This
part of literature review proceeds based on the two narrative fashions to map out
what major points have been proposed by researchers in the field.
3.1.1 Politics-narrative Fashion: An Institutional Barrier
Regarding the hukou system as an institutional barrier weights up its impacts on
educational inequality for migrant students from a perspective of government actions,
which tends to analyses political and administrative influences.
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In the earlier phase of the hukou system, where the urban-rural division had been
the most distinguishing feature. Wang and Zuo (1999) believe that the identity
division is “one of the most glaring legacies of the 20th century Chinese socialism”,
and “arose from a socialist industrialization process” (p.276). As a “devastating”
result under the political regime, rural residents that accounted for the vast national
population “not only endured a standard of living far below that in the urban sectors,
they were also denied to access social welfare benefits” (Wong & Zuo, 1999, p.276).
As one of initial political motivations, the hukou system was proceeded as a
“migrant-control policy” under the context of “rapid increase of rural migrants in
Chinese cities”, particularly, after the “open-door policy” in the late 20th century
(Wang & Zuo, 1999, p.276). The Chinese central government promulgated numerous
laws and regulations to heighten the social welfare regime for rural residents and new
migrants, while local authorities were hesitant to implement subsequently due to
financial burden that is the major coefficient (Montgomery, 2012).
Due to the top-down political regime, local governments in China face plights of
balancing social welfare provision mechanisms to different social groups. As what
discussed above, decentralization reforms in the hukou system took place in order to
implement more appropriate political models to preferably serve residents. However,
the change was progressed slowly due to the originality of the political motivations
of the hukou system. At present, “official identity” is still based on hukou booklet
that is the object of reference to the issuance of the “residential identification card” in
view of geographic units (Zhang & Tao, 2012, p.2883). For equalizing rights of
enjoying social welfare in cities, “hukou change” became a favored tactic for
migrants in cities. However, the process of converting original hukou status is not
undemanding. Big cities, such as Shanghai and Beijing, set higher thresholds in this
issue. Zhang and Tao (2012) conduct an experiment by employing city’s entry barrier
(CEB hereinafter) index to rank the difficulty of acquiring “hukou change”. In the
study, those cities tend to “impose a higher entry barrier to its hukou” alongside a
“pro-growth mentality and metaphors on political economy and urbanization”
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(Zhang & Tao, 2012, p.2883).
This is unlike most countries in the world that do not regulate internal migration
(Bao, Bodvarsson, Hou & Zhao, 2011). In China, where the situation is reasonably
opposite inasmuch as its demographic feature and limitations in resources,
“accessing schools, health services, attractive jobs and low-cost housing” are
depended on the hukou status (Bao et al., 2011, p.564). In light of economic
development and opening up, internal migration in China is a typical social
phenomenon and can be categorized as “rural-to-urban” or “non-local-to-local”.
Under the background of decentralized reforms in the hukou system, Chinese local
governments have used a certain tactics to tackle with social issues as results of the
increasing and unbalanced the movement. In this regard, developed regions keep
drawing drains and low-costly labor-force, CEB as a political lever is normally set at
a higher standard in the cities (Zhang & Tao, 2012).
In respect of educational access and attainment for migrant students, alike other
social welfare programs, the hukou system matters as usual, although the cause-effect
relationship seems to become enervate owing to decentralization reforms in the
recent years. In the literature, the dominating argument focuses on the rural-urban
division that highlights disadvantages of rural migrants (e.g. Chan & Zhang, 1999;
Fu & Ren, 2010; Montgomery, 2012; Wang & Zuo, 1999; Zhang & Treiman, 2013).
Without doubt, institutional arrangements, such as the hukou system, is the major
cause for educational inequality (Zhang & Treiman, 2013). Because the hukou
system, as a political root of impairment that “remains intact while the population,
has shifted dramatically to the massive rural to urban migration” (Zhang & Trieman,
2013, p.71).
Also, urbanization is the other driving force magnetizing vigor of researchers to
rural-urban division on the topic of the hukou analysis. In March 2014, the Chinese
central government released its first national urbanization plan that “outlines a bold
move to grant urban hukou to 100 million people” (Chan, 2014, p.1). It is a political
order by using the hukou system as a lever to reshape urbanization. This blueprint
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can help China to achieve “genuine urbanization” and solve relevant social problems
in its urbanized process (Chan, 2014, p.1). Floating population in China can be
viewed as a “temporary form of migration” and “maintain a double (rooting in rural
regions and living in cities) residential status” (Zhu, 2007, p.65). This residential
characteristic brings challenges into social administration at flow-in destinations and
affects many social welfare arrangements. The social welfare programs therefore are
facing a rearrangement and reorganization situation, including education services
provision.
Generally, it is rational to reckon decentralized reforms within the hukou system
as an administrative way responding the emerging social demands alongside the new
form of urbanization in China. As a political lever, the Chinese government is eager
to use the hukou system to balance social welfare provision including education
services through decentralization initiatives. Unlike the majority of prior studies, this
research highlights the concept, non-local migrants, instead of rural migrants in terms
of their children’s education in cities and towns. This is because the government has
released the intention of syncretizing rural and urban social welfare provision since
2014 (State Council, 2014).
The hukou system is a typical political manner regulating population and social
welfare programs. On the government side, political actions to hukou reforms which
have been discoursed in decentralization characteristics are inevitable to be analyzed
by researchers over the past. Political intentions incorporated into the hukou system
is viewed as a root of vitalizing unbalanced social situations. Inequality, therefore, is
a result of the political actions in education governance (Yang, Huang & Liu, 2014).
Explicitly, various policies are carries of political intentions and desires of delivering,
distributing and subjectively generating inequality in the present context, exemplified
by educational practices.
3.1.2 Sociology-narrative Fashion: Social Background Inheritance
The other explanation widely used in the literature regarding the hukou system
and educational inequality as well as migrant issues is the social capital theory (Ma
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& Wu, 2019). Unlike the discussions from politics which regards the hukou system
as a manner of maintaining social order, the social capital theory emphasizes
concepts, including family and parent backgrounds, social networks and social class,
which insinuates certain kinds of consequences of educational impairment (Cheng &
Selden, 1994; Coleman, 1988).
The hukou system, originated in the 1950s, was extremely strict in the 1960s and
1970s under the highly centralized planning economic system (Chan & Zhang, 1999).
At that moment, the number of residents who were eligible to convert hukou status
was limited (Wu & Treiman, 2007). The threshold of migration started being receded
since the “open-door” policy in the late 1970s. Despite all of that, non-local residents
including agricultural and non-agricultural hukou holders still face a dimmed
situation of changing non-local hukou into local cities (Ma & Wu, 2019). These
non-local hukou residents are treated as a marginalized group being excluded from
local social welfare provision. In terms of the eligibility of accessing public
education, hukou status is a determinant indisputably (Ma & Wu, 2019).
Besides, due to the institutionalized schooling segregation in China, hukou status
of migrant families, by and large, determines educational opportunities, outcome and
learning-quality of migrant children. Goodburn (2009) and Woronov (2004) dig out
that the majority of non-local hukou students normally have no better choice than
their local counterparts but have to step into migrant schools with poorer, unlicensed
and unstable supports from local governments. Megacities such as Beijing and
Shanghai further tightened migration regulations by introducing the alternatives of
the hukou system such as the “five-certificate”7 although the 2006 new Compulsory
Education Law points out that public education should be equally opened to a larger
extensive range of migrant social groups (Qian & Walker, 2015).
One of the highly-refereed scholars on the column of social capital theory is the
Five-certificate: non-local hukou students questing compulsory education at public and some
private schools are required parents or guardians’ working certificate, practical residence
certificate, the family hukou booklet, certificate of non-guardian in hukou registered sites, and
temporary residence permit (Ministry of Education, 2014).
7
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French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu proposing the concept “intellectual background”
which is viewed as the ancestor of social capital theory. Afterwards, Bourdieu (1986)
views social capital as “the aggregate of actual or potential resources, linked to
possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of
mutual acquaintance or recognition” (p.88). Referring to the definition, the meaning
of social capital has been developed by scholarly successors, taking into account of
socioeconomic phenomena in different societies. Foster and Maas (2016), for
instance, conceptualize and emphasize that social capital as the pool of “resources
embedded within a set of social networks that can be used to produce socioeconomic
benefits” (cited by Ma & Wu, 2019, p.166). Likewise, James Coleman (1988),
proposes that social capital in family and community “in the creation of human
capital in the rising generation” (p.109), and distinguishes social capital from human
capital that is more individual dependence, as well as brings out the concept “family
social capital” which underlines the “strength of child-parent interactions” (Ma &
Wu, 2019, p.166). As a theoretical development in this stream, the other concept
“community social capital” that refers to social resources and networks out of
families stresses the importance of non-family factors in the period of children’s
development and incorporates other stakeholders, including peers, friends and
teachers of children, into a profitable chain (Chattogadhay, 2014). In specific view of
migrant educational issues, Coleman (1988) hypothesizes that migrant children tend
to have poorer education resources, supports and outcomes than non-migrant
children as social resources and networks of migrants that exists in original sites are
frequently broken and become more unstable during each move.
Based upon these theoretical fundamentals of social capital, dozens of empirical
sociological studies evaluating the relationship and the key role of family or parents
in children’s education in western societies, exemplified by studies in American
cities (e.g. Hagan, MacMillan & Wheaton, 1996; Pribesh & Downey, 1999; Ream,
2005). In China’s social context, without doubt, there are emerging empirical studies
that have concluded a “positive effect of social capital for all children’s human
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capital” (Ma & Wu, 2019, p.166). Since the hukou system is embedded with a unique
characteristic, namely, children’s hukou status exclusively depends on their parents’
hukou status, it is rational to view the hukou system as one of institutionalized social
capitals in China making a difference in the distribution of social welfare and
services. Straightforwardly, as what discussed above, the hukou status originates
“identification card”, the hukou status of family is the first official identity of the
Chinese citizens. Lu (2008) argues that the hierarchy and structure within the hukou
system persistently influences opportunities of social mobility. Furthermore, Cheng
and Selden (1994) put that the creation of partial hierarchies is a result of the
existence of the hukou system, which produces immobilized social structure in the
era of mobilized collectivism. In terms of the educational attainment by migrant
children, Lau and Li (2011) argue that socioeconomic and demographic backgrounds,
which is largely affected by hukou originality and revealed from different
impairments of social resources and networks, are linked to school characteristics
and children’s subjective well-being. According to Buchmann and Hannum (2011),
besides, educational opportunities and outcomes can be extensively explained by
family and social backgrounds. “Persistent inequality is attributed to the stability of
institutional structures that associate children’s social backgrounds with educational
opportunities in a society” (Wu, 2011, p.3). Family and social backgrounds can be
further understood as social origin revealed by hukou status and inducts educational
stratification (Wu, 2011; Yu, 2006).
Analyses, in general, either viewing the hukou system as “an institutional
barrier” or discoursing from a perspective of “family-social background inheritance”,
used to emphasize the division between rural and urban residents, and mapped out
soundly how this division further perplexes rural hukou students in terms of
educational attainment in non-rural regions (e.g. Afridi, Li & Ren, 2015; Ling, 2015;
Wang, 2012). This study, first, upholds that the category defined as “rural-urban”
cannot reflect the reforming trend in the hukou system and its affect on educational
chance since the central government highlights the integration of compulsory
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education in rural and urban areas in the Eighteenth National Congress of the CPC
(China Daily, 2018). “Non-local”, accordingly, is more currently applicable to
showcase the situation of students, both rural and non-local urban hukou holders,
who are marginalized in the basic educational process. In addition, the dispute on the
effect of decentralization between traditional theorists and emerging practitioners has
been discoursed in the former chapters and induct the theoretical inquiry which
makes this research meaningful.
Furthermore, not only has prior studies focused on rural migrants, which may
not be advancing with times, but the two narrative fashions have rarely been
integrated into one project. There are studies favoring political analysis to the hukou
system and its impact on educational development (e.g. Bao et al., 2011; Zhang &
Tao, 2012), while the other analytical perspective, family-social background
inheritance, is argued as the most prevalent narrative in the sociology of education
field (e.g. Ma & Wu, 2019; Wu, 2010, 2011; Wu & Treiman, 2007). This study
embodies the two analytical narratives in an integrated theoretical framework
described in the following parts.
Last but not least, this project with a comparative analysis perspective can fill in
the gap of literature that used to shine to a national level analysis in a long run based
on certain data pools such as China General Social Survey (e.g. Wu, 2010; Wu &
Zhang, 2010; Yu, 2006). A comparative manner of inquiring research interests can
uncover the difference between cities and thus the effectiveness of policies can be
tested, which certainly echoes the kernel of decentralization of hukou system. In
what follows, the explanations on the two thematic terms are presented as the mast of
the following conceptual framework.
3.2 Conceptualization
This section conceptualizes the two thematic terms, one is “decentralization”,
and the other is “inequality of educational opportunities” (IEO hereinafter) which is a
more rigorous explanation on “educational inequality” refereed in this research.
29

3.2.1 Decentralization
Decentralization has become a modish tactic in the public policy and governance
field since the 1950s. Generally speaking, the understandings of decentralization can
be sorted into three historical stages. At each of the stages, the content and scope of
decentralization embody differently. The following table summarized by Gaulė (2010)
incorporates these meanings and connotations over the process, which showcases an
overall development of the decentralization meanings.

Phase 1: 1950s - 1980s

Phase 2: 1980s - 1990s

Phase 3: since the 1990s

Decentralization of
hierarchical structure and
bureaucracy seeking for more
efficiency in public service
delivery and strengthening of
local government
responsibilities.

Distribution of political
powers, democratization,
market liberalization,
involvement of private sector
in order to reduce power of
the public sector and
strengthen the local
government.

Openness of public
governance and efficiency
achieved by participation and
teamwork of the public sector
organization at various levels
of government and
cooperation with external
group.

Table 3.1 Development of the content and scope of decentralization.
Source: Gaulė (2010, p.49).

Decentralization as a political term was initially developed during the period of
British and French colonial administration after the Second World War, when some
of developing countries started realizing that centralized governance seemed to be
less efficient to deliver public goods and services due to the increasing amount of
public spending forming into financial burdens (Gaulė, 2010). Afterwords, the
second phase of development on decentralization between the 1980s and the 1990s
was highlighting functional changes of government in the administrative process.
During this period, the authoritative capability of central government had started
being constrained (Gaulė, 2010). The focused point in the second phase was shifted
from “an adequate division of responsibilities within the system of public
governance” to “search for effective ways of government intervention in market and
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economy” (Gaulė, 2010, p.49). Private and non-governmental organizations (NGOs
hereinafter) started playing important roles at driving the economic development
(Gaulė, 2010). The third period began in the 1990s and has been lasting at present,
which quests for an open system in public governance and a “wider public, political
and economic participation” (Gaulė, 2010, p.49). The driving force in the third time
of decentralization evolution is globalization. Critically, the interweaving phenomena
between globalization and localization force government to reconsider, change and
rebuild its role in both marketing and social administrative fields (Gaulė, 2010). This,
certainly, sparks off a number of emerging explanations on the scope and content of
decentralization, and reshapes its conception.
It is universally agreed that decentralization as a policy-based strategy reveals
the increasing trend of globalization which objectively brings emerging appeals in
politics to modern societies by reshaping social, cultural and economic forms (Mok,
2003). A wealth of literature have argued the interrelation and interaction between
globalization and political transformation. Radical globalists, for instance, argue that
the emergence of multinational corporations imposes and furthers politicians’ desires
of changing the means of running states (Fukuyama, 1992; Giddens, 1999).
Additionally, political and policy exercises in different layers of governments have
been largely influenced by international organizations, such as the World Bank and
the World Trade Organization, (Cooper, 1996; Smith, 1995). Accordingly, a growing
number of scholars started to believe that, in a globalization era, politics and
governance are largely impinged by emerging transnational forms, and the existed
policymaking mechanisms controlling autonomy and providing public services
eventually became less efficient and effective (Mok, 2003). This, particularly, is
revealed through global economic transformations which quest for central and local
governments to rethink roles and redesign strategies appropriately (Mok, 2003).
Along with such dramatic economic transformations taking place in the world, in
response to extra pressures and emerging complexities, and for the sake of improving
efficiency and effectiveness of the mechanisms delivering public services, innovative
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initiatives of running governments have been pursued (Dale, 1997), such as emerging
concepts in public administration, including “reinventing government” (Osborne &
Gaebler, 1992), “entrepreneurial government” (Ferlie, Fitzgerald & Pettigrew 1996)
and “governance without government” (Rosenau, 1992). These viewpoints regarding
political and governance transformations get across various sectors in and outside of
political realms. In the meantime, neoliberalism domains discussions on
globalization (Mok, 2003). Accordingly, the role of market and individuals
increasingly matters in public affairs (Faulks, 2000). The responsibility of
government is increasingly shared by non-governmental actors (Elliott & Salamon,
2002; Pierre, 2000). And it is agreed that “the role of state is declining” when
“non-state sectors are playing an increasingly important role” (Mok, 2003, p.5),
which quests for “corporatization, marketization and privatization” to gear up for
dramatic changes in the role of government (Mok & Currie, 2002).
In the process of the role reconstruction, various governance philosophies came
out and responded to ideologies of managerialism and economic rationalism (Deem,
2001). One of them refers to decentralization, which is a term that incorporates
complex interactions in public affairs. As this research examines the effectiveness of
decentralization, it is imperative to identify what decentralization represents and
what particular forms it contains. This research refers to the definition by the World
Bank on decentralization, which is discoursed as below:
“Decentralization embraces a variety of notions and is a multifaceted
concept referring to the transfer of authority and responsibility for public
functions from the central governments to subordinate or quasi-independent
government organizations and/or the private sectors.”
- Decentralization Thematic Team, the World Bank8.
By reason of the increasing dissatisfaction with over-centralized approaches to

“What is decentralization: general information.” Contributed by the Decentralization Thematic
Team
of
the
World
Bank.
Retrieved
from:
http://www.ciesin.org/decentralization/English/General/Different_forms.html
8
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delivering public services (Rondinelli & Nellis, 1986), transitional and developing
countries, particularly, employ and deploy the decentralized strategies to improve the
quality of governance, increase transparency and accountability, and promote
effective and efficient production and delivery of social services (Cohen & Peterson,
1997). Of these practices, fiscal, administrative, market and financial decentralization
are major instruments (Ahmad, Devarajan, Khemani & Shah, 2005). These forms
present different connotations and characteristics (Ahmad et al., 2005). So it should
be deliberate and distinguished when conceptualizing decentralization for analysis.
Based on the research interest, this study adopts administrative decentralization
to discourse decentralized reforms in the hukou system and uncovers decentralized
traits in education governance. In light of the definition of administrative
decentralization, this research refers to the Decentralization Thematic Team of the
World Bank:
“Administrative decentralization is a means of redistributing authority,
responsibility and financial resources for providing public services among
different levels of government and the transfer of responsibility for the
planning, financing and management of certain public functions from the
central government and its agencies to field units of government agencies,
subordinate units or semi-autonomous public authorities or corporations, or
area-wide, regional or functional authorities.”
To approach the panoramic view of the concept, the following figure presents the
inner forms of administrative decentralization. Different forms of decentralization are
always combined and interacted with each other and appear in different social
administrative practices across countries, within countries, and even within sectors.
This research is not designed to be proceeded as an entirely public administrative
study. Thus, it is not necessary to detach details of each of these forms of
decentralization. As an essential part of literature review, nonetheless, constructing a
comprehensive overview towards the thematic term, decentralization, is needed,
which inducts the conceptual concern of this research by retaking the contributions
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of literature on this column.
Administrative Decentralization
Categories

Form
Deconcentratio

Delegation
The transfer of
decision-making

The transfer of
tasks and work,
but not authority
to other units in
the organization.

from higher to
lower
hierarchical
units, but the
authority can be
withdrawn at the
discretion of the
delegating unit.

Devolution

Functional

Territorial

authority to an

The shift of

Distributions

autonomous

powers

of control

unit that can act

between

among

independently,

various

different

or a unit that

authorities

geographical

can act without

that operate

tiers of

first asking

in parallel.

government.

The transfer of

permission.

Figure 3.1 Inner forms and categories of administrative decentralization.
Source: Bray (1999) and Mok (2003).

3.2.2 Inequality of Educational Opportunities
With the specific view of understanding IEO precisely, it is prerequisite to figure
down “social inequality” that is a widely discussed concept containing a macroscopic
range of social issues in different societies.
First, Dworkin (2000) argues that the discussing priority of “social inequality”
has surpassed “social equality”. It is clear that social and political scientists have
been curious about topics tied to “inequality” more than “equality” for a long period
of time. Thus it is little doubt that discussions on social inequality keep drawing
attention. It is understandable because researchers shoulder responsibilities to resolve
problems by offering advice through empirical and theoretical studies. In the
literature, social inequality is a term yielding discussions in the field of sociology and
social science studies. Dorling (2015) listed five faces of social inequality, which are
narrated as: 1) elitism is efficient; 2) exclusion is necessary; 3) prejudice is nature; 4)
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greed is good; and 5) despair is inevitable. This is a pattern that describes “social
inequality” and provides a framework to define what social phenomena involve in
the “inequality” genes. Similarly, “social inequality” is linked to poverty, which
further brings institutions classifying social groups through unequal distributive
mechanisms in public services (Murali & Oyebode, 2004; Wilkinson, 1997). In the
literature, widely, it is agreed that “social inequality” used to imply “wealth
disparity”, exemplified by the statement of Cowell (2011) who pointed that in order
to measure “social inequality”, a comprehensive concept of “income” indicating
individual’s well-being in the society is necessary. And it is undeniable that in view
of the nature of “inequality”, measuring “social inequality” needs calculative
indicators with mathematical or numerical traits to illustrate complications and
implications (Cowell, 2011).
Despite there is a dominant volume of studies valuing “social inequality” from
an economic perspective with mathematical approaches, there are interpretations
discoursing what “social inequality’” means and expounding from the perspective of
sociology and policy. Hiraide (2013) explains that “social inequality” is mirrored as
an unequal or unbalanced distribution concerning resources including power, wealth
and income, which is reflected in opportunities of health, education and employment.
Blackburn (2008) indicates that “social inequality” refers to gender, ethics,
occupation, health, wealth and education, and all these could be defined as
“individual identities”. According to Blackburn (2008) and Cowell (2011),
“inequality” of “what” ought to be a more meaningful path to interpret specific social
phenomena. With reference to the research interest, the meaning of IEO, as one of
three “educational inequality” forms, needs to be reviewed.
“Equal access to education is among the basic human rights and a component of
well-being”, which is entitled to each citizen who as long as meets requirements
based on relevant laws (Thomas, Wang & Fan, 1999, p.2). This is a representative
discourse to the nature of “educational equality”. However, in consideration of the
dynamic of the meanings and implications of “social inequality”, “educational
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inequality” is also explained diversely in the literature. In terms of the sociological
perspective, education is viewed as “an avenue of social mobility and a tool for
social reproduction” (Wu, 2010, p.91). Establishing a sound educational system,
however, is still an extravagant hope in many countries due to numerous
confounding factors. As a negative consequence, “educational inequality” has been a
front-page issue for a long-lasting period. In both developed and developing
countries, “educational inequality” keeps a nuclear position among a number of
policy agendas (Ferreira & Gignoux, 2013).
Carrying the emergence of discussions on “educational inequality”, “persistent
inequality” became a principal issue for research after the second wave of education
expansion that began right after the Second World War (Teese, Lamb, Duru-Bellat &
Helme, 2007). In the second half of the 20th century, a growing number of countries
invested heavily in education (Teese, 2007). Unfortunately, those efforts did not
round off the commitment that was promised to erect up a system of “educational for
all” by casting aside structural barriers (Teese, 2007). In the meantime, due to the
emergence of neoliberalism along with globalization, marketization appeals to
private funding in the process of educational reforms, which encourages to maintain
“structures of social differentiation” (Teeze, 2007, p.1). Privatization in educational
systems in the era of neoliberalism further classifies social groups by wealth, social
and family background and other “individual identities”.
“Educational inequality”, therefore, becomes a social pandemic. In the literature,
studies on “educational inequality” can be categorized as follow: 1) “educational
attainment”; 2) “educational achievement”; and 3) “educational opportunities”
(Ferreira & Gignoux, 2013; Teeze, 2007). The first one sheds light on “rights” and is
claimed as “rights to receive education” based on laws and regulations, which
highlights faulty law-system-constructions (Zhang, 2001). The second correlates of
“outcomes”, which is in a circulation with “quality” of education and prevalent as
“inequality in school quality” (Ferreira & Gignoux, 2013; Ma, Hou, Huang, Wang,
Li, Zhou & Du, 2018). In light of sociological theories, the issues of “educational
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attainment” and “educational achievement” link to socioeconomic status (SES
hereinafter) of families. In other words, students from lower social classes are likely
to have less probability to receive good education and achieve sound results due to
family disadvantages (Agrawal, 2014; Guo, 2011; Ma et al., 2018).
Both concepts within “educational inequality” expounded above, unquestionably,
are focal spots in the literature. However, this research keeps attention on the third
form of “educational inequality”, IEO. We argue that gaining equal opportunities to
access public compulsory education is more imperative to the study objects that are
intended to be investigated within the hukou system. In addition, what particularly
differs from the first two forms of “educational inequality” is that IEO indicates
straightforwardly the correlation between “educational inequality” and institutional
barriers which are reflected by the hukou system in this research.
There are a growing number of research indicating that education correlates of
incomes, health status, well-being, a lower probability of engaging on crime, and
other social dimensions (e.g. Bedard & Ferrall, 2003; Blau & Kahn, 2005; Grossman,
2006; Lochner & Moretti, 2004). Due to these incentives, the distribution of
education resources draws concern from the public and government. In addition,
these concerns mirror fairness, particularly in terms of the distribution of educational
opportunities for all types of family backgrounds (Ferreira & Gignoux, 2013). An
equal opportunities for education is the predetermined circumstance for talking about
“quality of educational achievement” (Ferreira & Gignoux, 2013). In contrast, IEO
could not be overcome by individuals’ wits or the degree of efforts inherently
shifting the unequal circumstances in the process of “educational achievement”
(Ferreira & Gignoux, 2013). Specifically, in Chinese social context, external
circumstances, such as the hukou system, largely impact on educational choices
beyond individuals’ control (Ferreira & Gignoux, 2013).
How to understand IEO, how has it been classified, and what implications does
it keep? According to the literature, this research adopts the explanation from Zhang
(2001). In the study, there are three forms and of “inequality” existing in IEO and
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functioning in the realm of compulsory education:
First, IEO refers to an unequal admission system, which perplexes marginalized
groups in the beginning of looking for education. This form of IEO is characterized
with spatial gender and ethical inequality. These social indicators decide whether
individuals could get equal treatments in the process of admission;
Second, IEO refers to an unequal educational delivery system that happens in
the process of being educated. More specifically, the second form of IEO indicates
two aspects of inequality: 1) as what mentioned above, due to scarce educational
resources, some of students could not get equal environments and materials including
staffing and handbooks as what students from advantaged groups could receive; and
2) there is a shortage of equal treatments in the process of teaching. For example,
teachers could not treat students equally and rationally based on their repertoires;
Last, IEO refers to unequal treatments after education, such as an increasing
trend of discrimination to graduates who desire to go to higher level of schools and
look for employments.
By specifying the research interest, this research sheds light on the first form of
inequality in IEO, namely, inequality happens in the process of admission. First, it is
agreed that admission as the first procedure of being educated is a prerequisite to
further consider following issues which are laid in educational process and outcome.
Second, in light of the hukou regime, it is inevitable to discuss how this institutional
barrier perplexes marginalized students from the first stage of schooling career.
3.3 Conceptual Framework
As aforementioned discussions, the study incorporates political and sociological
aspects to present an integrated analytical framework. This is because the research
interest is to examine the effectiveness of decentralization, by referring to the hukou
system and its impact on IEO exclusively implicating migrants’ interests in the case.
In what follows, two theoretical discoursing perspectives are reviewed to form into
the conceptual framework of the research that theorizes the research inquiries.
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3.3.1 A Better-off and Worse-off Education Context
In terms of basic educational system, China is a country where the system is
centralized exemplified by specific educational policies at national level (e.g. Laws
on Compulsory Education), which is different from countries with decentralized
compulsory educational system such as the United States, where, though, they
enacted national regulations on compulsory education as well. Amid decentralized
educational systems, in practice, local governments and authorities aware much the
influence of local communities (Kerckhoff, 1955). Quite contrary, under a
centralized educational system, curriculum contents, tuition of charging, and
schooling organizations, scopes, allocations and distributions are heavily depended
on subnational governments which are directly supervised by upper side of
authorities (Smith & Cheung, 1986). So thus educational agendas in countries with
centralized educational systems keep accordant essentially.
In socialist states, for maintaining advantages in social distributions, socialist
bureaucrats employ strategies to secure existing advancements after privileges
established (Djilas, 1957). Education is one of key fields mirroring directly those
privileges. In order to acquire legitimacy, state policies can more easily make a
different on maintaining those privileges in centralized systems due to the top-down
bureaucratic design. In this case, socialist states tend to regard and make good use of
political system as a tool to maintain the elite status in society, which transits social
superiority to posterity by relishing existing privileges in many social domains, such
as education (Mateju, 1993; Simkus & Andorka, 1982). For the reasons why socialist
states are able to control and manage privileges through “legitimate” approaches, the
structurally political power of “socialism” and “socialist distribution”, and the lack of
“market discipline” come to the front (Connor, 1991).
Although the idea of “egalitarianism” in social distribution backing up, socialist
states have rarely a equalized society, such as a greater educational stratification in
the end period of the Soviet (Wu, 2011). On the column of theories of new class,
there are two views held in terms of the mix of educational inequality and equality.
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On the one hand, socialist states and their representatives including various layers of
governments are defenders of social privileges and emerging elite social groups.
Thus government “is responsible for producing educational inequality”, particularly,
at “later period of socialist regimes” (Wu, 2011, p.5). Once a new social structure
established, socialist states tend to defend emerging privileges through enacting laws,
making policies and revising regulations (Djilas, 1957). On the other hand, in
consideration of the “goal of egalitarianism in socialist regimes, government is
viewed as a “consistent promoter of educational equality” (Wu, 2011, p.5). However,
owing to the limited linkage between policies and the people’s livelihood, which is a
result of top-down and centralized political regimes, “egalitarianism” cannot come
true (Wu, 2011). On account of the latter viewpoint, although the “egalitarian” goal is
applauded, the centralized political regime used to be the fountainhead of producing
failed policies to equalize the access, attainment and outcome of public services,
including education.
In socialism societies, where individual properties are diminished, education is
on additional priority (Simkus & Andokar, 1982). But as what discussed above, a
social structure established by the political interventions, the elite influences the
process of policymaking to maintain their privileges in education, which creates a
sociopolitical and socioeconomic base for schooling that is reflected in developing as
“educational embourgeoisement” (Breen, Luijkx, Muller & Pollak, 2009; Covello &
Bollen, 1979; Muller & Karle, 1993; Simkus & Andokar, 1982). It tends to produce a
vicious circle in educational development, in which the better gets better and the
worse becomes worse.
The hukou system yields a division between “local” and “non-local”, or “urban”
and “rural”, which is indicated through the household registration booklet (hukou
ben). As it is instituted by the state, this system has been viewed as a basis of
approaching benefits, including education, in a centralized political system (Wu &
Treiman, 2007). Also, as aforementioned discussions, the hukou status features the
family inheritance according to the laws. This indicates that children’s hukou status is
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depended on their parents’ hukou status. Due to urbanization and unbalanced
development between rural and urban China, education quality differentiates hugely
in rural and urban regions as well, which is a form of “rural-urban conflict” alongside
an uneven urbanization (Ann, Wu, Zheng, Zhang & Shen, 2014). Even though in
urban regions, private and public education are proceeding in variegated (Lim, 2014).
To review from the perspective of political regime, the socialist state system could be
a root of producing the uneven by policies, like other socialist states (Wei, 1999).
At present, the hukou system is a ground of the state intervention in social
service arrangement and distributions in China, which makes a difference by various
policies at both national and local level, when decentralization has been implemented
in the reform process particularly (Wang & Liu, 2018). It is irrational to conclude
that the Chinese government uses the hukou system to manage benefits, such as
education, for the elite. But educational prospective for different social groups in
China indeed presents divergence and segregation, which seems to more noticeable
(Li, Sato & Sicular, 2013). In the meantime, sociological theories used to be core
components in most of social policy studies, as the analytical objectives in social
policy research tends to link to society or members of society (Mishra, 1981).
Marxian class theorists assert that “class”, reflected as “individual position” in
social environment, is produced in production, and social hierarchy is formed based
on arts of labor division (Parkin, 1979). The terminology, “class”, in capitalism
societies signifies “collective action” that resembles a furnace assimilating
homogeneous economic interests shared by a particular group of people (Andrew,
1983). Marxian standpoint to the differentiation of class derives from “class
antagonism” in capitalism societies. Specifically, workers and capitalists own
interests opposite. The former is to maximize benefits of welfare while the latter is
dedicated to maximizing profit at a limited expense. Amid the contradiction, workers
are viewed as the set of proletariat while capitalists belong to bourgeoisie (Thompson,
1963). Thus, the thesis of fundamental antagonism in social class has been
inclusively regarded as a bilateral hostile camp between “proletarianization” and
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“embourgeoisement”, which is a opposite concept unit narrated as class conflict
(Andrew, 1983; Thompson, 1963). From Marxian perspective, workers and
capitalists are fundamental components of a society, with great hostile. It produces a
teared society, and a dangerous and venerable group of people, “lumpenproletariats”
(Stallybrass, 1990; Thoburn, 2002). The utmost goal of Marxian class quests for a
communism or socialism society, in which the ideal of “egalitarianism” becomes a
shared value as class stratification loses its rationality and necessity of existence
(Almond, 1983).
In education, Marxian theory of social class, inasmuch as the formation of social
structure and the distinction of power allocation in the process of production within a
capitalist system, run against that education in a capitalism society means
“meritocracy” and is designed to feed the ruling class. More crucially, the ruling
class uses education to maintain existing social order and stability by transmitting
ruling class ideology and preparing proletarians for capitalism, which is labeled as
“brainwashes” (Kennedy & Power, 2010). Straightforwardly, Bowles and Gintis
argue that the main function of education is to equip workers from lower social class
having right attitude to work (cited by Apple, 1988). This functional standpoint on
educational allocation and manipulation echoes the thesis of the new class theories
and manifests that ruling class manages educational systems in capitalism societies.
But, non-Marxists argue that equality and justice in education has been eroded at
distribution of educational services in not only capitalist and colonial states, but also
authoritarian states (Connell, 2012, 2013).
In contemporary society, capital is reflected by not only economic indicators but
cultural and social components through social exchanges in social networks
(Bourdieu, 1986). This is different from Marx’s conceptualization on capital that is
hypothesized with reference to commodity materialized (Lin, 1999). Social capital in
Bourdieu’s argument generates from and connects with his standpoint on class. In
respect of the theories of class, class can be viewed as a production of constructing
social reality in contemporary society, and individual social space or aesthetic
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disposition represents social status (Bourdieu, 1987). Thus social world is a
multidimensional space that is constructed by “discovering the powers or forms of
capital” (Bourdieu, 1987, p.4). As to the operation of the social world, Bourdieu
(1987) argues that the structure of the space is given by the distribution of capital and
properties. In Bourdieu’s view, capital is a property that is created in human activities,
and social class then is constructed empirically (Bourdieu, 1987).
Bourdieu’s (1986, 1987) viewpoints on capital incorporates four kinds. The first
is economic capital which is the fountainhead of other forms of capital. The second is
cultural capital or information capital. The third is social capital based on
connections among group members. The fourth is symbolic capital that is a power
being legitimate by agents. The volume and composition of different forms of capital
consist of social status in social space, which is understood as social class that is
constructed by certain ways of weighting capital asset by agents that pass similar
conditions of existence into homogeneous groups and form a taxonomy to classify
social groups (Bourdieu, 1987). The determining factor during the process is the
dynamic interaction among different forms of capital managed by agents (Bourdieu,
1987). Although the theories of social class from Marxian are forming a binary
system, which holds a different viewpoint from Bourdieu’s theory on social class,
there is still the intertwined. To combine Marxian and Bourdieu’s theories of class,
“bourgeoisie” relies on its abundance of capital and produces more interests echoing
its needs while “proletariat” just can fulfill basic desires. Therefore, “bourgeoisie”
with advantageous capital holds more powers and assets to influence agents’ through
impacting political agendas, which further optimizes “bourgeoisie” and deteriorates
“proletariat” through social resource redistribution.
On the basis of the theoretical framing of social class from Marxists and
Bourdieu,

social

origin
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notion

determined

by
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conceptualizations of social class, which reflects how social background and
originality influence the development of following generations. According to Nash
(1999), in terms of educational aspect, “the generative power of social class,
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conceptualized as a set of structures of social relationships, constitutes the major
cause of differentiated educational attainments” (cited by Vryonides & Lamprianou,
2013, p.78). In practice, individual’s birthplace, race, gender and other physical traits
derive from parents, and the physical genes are institutionally socialized in a
contemporary human society. Different forms of capital combined determines social
class, and people inherit those features of capital and are defined as the same social
class (Bourdieu, 1987). Thus, a “better-off” (the better gets better) and “worse-off”
(the worse gets worse) context is formed.
Migrant students, concerned in this research as the objective, used to be referred
as a marginalized social group in accessing public services and welfare in China
(Wang, 2008). As aforementioned discussions, the elite in Chinese society enjoy
priorities because of either financial positions or social networks, while the lower
social class struggles in the acceptance of basic social welfare due to the lack of
financial powers and social capitals (Zhou & Kim, 2006). The basis of identity is
hukou embodying the family inheritance from parents to offspring. In consideration
of the study case, it is prerequisite to input the theories of social class to understand
the social class situation of migrant students.
In short, the Chinese government employs the hukou system to manage the
priority in education for local residents, which can be indicated by the “local-first”
rule and understood by the theoretical discussions on new class theory. In the
meantime, as a result of uneven urbanization, big cities, such as the research sites,
Beijing and Shenzhen, draw immigrants in the last decades. This leads in fierce
competition between local and non-local residents in terms of accessing welfare and
public service, such as education. With reference to the theories of social class,
grassroots migrant students, due to poor family background and social network, tend
to be marginalized in basic educational attainment (Wang, 2008).
New class theory and social class theory are the macro discussions on IEO for
migrant students in China, from political and sociological perspective respectively. It
helps to generally understand IEO’s institution and formation in the socialist country
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and lead into the macro educational context with inequality for migrant students in
the socialist state. To fix the analytical points for this policy research, the following
sheds light on the thematic concept of decentralization and explain why financing
and regulation are decided to examine as the analytical targets in this study.
3.3.2 Decentralization Tactics in Education Governance
Decentralization is a form of governance by highlighting reforms in some states.
China’s educational reforms echo decentralization as well. In light of the standpoint
of Mok (2001, 2002, 2005), decentralized reforms in financing, regulation and
provision happened in the process of educational development in the post-Mao era of
China. In other words, alongside economic reforms, the Chinese central government
gradually steps out by discarding the direct supervision and liability in educational
development while, notwithstanding, changing as “regular and overall resource
coordinator” (Mok, 2001, p.123). Mok’s studies on decentralization in educational
context primarily refer to higher education. Nonetheless, he does not deny that
education governance model in various layers of organizations refers to the three
aspects as well, namely, financing, provision and regulation, of which all are focused
points in not only China but other places with school decentralization reforms,
including Sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe
(Bray, 1996; Chan & Wang, 2009; Cook, 2013; Hallinger, 1998; Hawkins, 2000;
Mok, 2003, 2005; Naidoo, 2005a, 2005b; Prawda, 1993). To let local authorities and
schools with a greater autonomy is a democratized attempt in educational sphere,
which used to be a cryptic function of decentralization (Naidoo, 2005a, 2005b).
Democratizing the forms of decentralization echoes globalization and marketization
in education, as a consequence with influence of neoliberalism (Astiz, Wiseman &
Baker, 2002; Mok, 2002).
Taking into account of this research, though the three fields are viewed as the
key components discussing educational decentralization, provision is not be
appropriate to be employed for discussing IEO in basic education. According to
Mok’s (2002) view, provision of decentralization is revealed not only with the nature
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of schooling settings (public or private), but in the contents of curricula in different
forms of educational organizations. This is exemplified by higher education where
private institutions favor market-oriented curricula to students for catering market
demands. However, this aspect of decentralization can rarely be illustrated in basic
education where the curricula are projected based on the central unit. Thereby,
financing and regulation as the essentials of the conceptual framework are employed
to process empirical analysis.
First, financing or fiscal decentralization in education governance is viewed as a
fundamental change in China’s educational system. In 1993, the central government
reiterated that policy decentralization and diversification of resources were
prioritized during the educational reforms (Mok, 2002). The central government
would support local authorities to establish local schools based on people’s
willingness (CPC Central Committee, 1993). As a result, the funding for educational
development started to be diversified, and come from non-public financial supports
from individuals, enterprises, charitable bodies, NGOs and foreign forces (Chan &
Wang, 2009). Thereby minban education started to grow alongside the outgrowth of
privatizing national educational system, which features “socialist market economy”
(Chan & Wang, 2009; Mok, 2002). Besides, funding diversification is indicated by
decentralized revenue arrangement on educational distributive system, from “micro
control” to “macro control” model (Mok, 2002; Mok & Wat, 1998). Local authorities
and schools hence are encouraged to look for additional funding resources instead of
completely replying on public finance in the process of shifting educational operating
paradigms (Mok, 1996).
Second, regulation is the other aspect of the reforms associated with educational
decentralization in China. The most evident indicator showing that the central
government steps out the manipulation of basic education is the program, Provincial
Demonstrative Primary/Secondary Schools (PDS hereinafter), which is also known
as key schools. What Mok (2002) argues is that “competition” among higher
educational

institutions

and

“external
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cooperation”

with

non-educational

organizations have been applauded and heartened by local governments. The PDS
scheme is the alternative of the “211” and “985” projects in China’s basic education,
which

lets

local

governments

formulate

regulatory-surveillance

and

rewards-penalties system on their own (Wang, 2005). Whereupon, the paradigms of
operating education emerge have been started to be diversified through policies at
local governments, though the curricula and contents of teaching keep nationally
accordant.
By aggregating the theories of new class, social class and decentralization tactics,
it is clear that 1) within the socialist political regime as the top-level design in China,
the hukou system plays the fundamental role of distributing educational resources; 2)
it is unsurprising that emerged non-lower social class tends to maintain the privilege
as “educational bourgeois”, which could be achieved through steering the practices in
the hukou system, such as making tendentious policies; and 3) decentralization
reform aims at the unbalanced educational scenario by endowing local authorities
with more and direct power to making policies based on local reality of migration
contexts.
With reference to theoretical discourses in the three clusters of scholarship, the
critically theoretical inquiry of this research can be illustrated in the following figure
that visualizes the “better-off and worse-off” educational scenario as the result of the
socialist political institution and unbalanced treatments within different social classes,
which triggers the research inquiry on whether decentralization reforms in the hukou
system and educational settings can reverse the unequal context. This can further be
specified into the primary research question: how effective these policies, with regard
to financing and regulation, are in equalizing educational opportunities for migrant
students in Beijing and Shenzhen? Furthermore, this following figure is the
assemblage of the core mission of this research, which is to examine the local
policies of financing and regulation in terms of the effectiveness of equalizing
education opportunities for migrant students.
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A Better-off and Worse-off Education Context
Change?
Financing + Regulation

Decentralization Tactics in Education Governance under the Context of Hukou
Decentralization

Figure 3.2 Conceptual framework.
Source: author’s own work.

Unlike a macro investigating intention, this research focuses on the effectiveness
of the two critical decentralization reforms and practices. This narrowed and focused
inquiry, not only, is appropriate to the scale of the research, but embeds the
theoretical meaningfulness of the empirical study. Additionally, this conceptual
framework points the nuclear research inquiry and theorizes and informs the primary
research question, which targets at the policy effectiveness. With the basis of the
conceptual framework, the following chapter inducts the methodology of this
research that is presented to uncover the researching philosophy and logic.
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Chapter 4 METHODOLOGY
Setting out with the restatement of the research questions, this chapter presents
the methodological concerns, including research contexts, sampling, data collection,
analysis, validity, and ethical issues..
4.1 Restatement of Research Questions
The primary research inquiry of this study is generated from a theoretical debate
over the effectiveness of decentralization: how effective these policies are in
equalizing educational opportunities for migrant students in Beijing and Shenzhen.
The answer to this question would be able to support the argument on examining the
theoretical debate by referring to the China case
To answer the primary question, it is a prerequisite to indicate what policies are
at the local governments to manage educational opportunities, respectively. Hence,
the question, under the context of hukou decentralization, what are policies
conceived by the local governments to manage educational opportunities for migrant
students in these two cities, is proposed to unveil the policy contexts in Beijing and
Shenzhen, which is the analytical basis for the primary research question.
4.2 A Qualitative Approach in Researching Inequality in Education
In light of resources and research intents, this study is designed in a qualitative
manner. Methodology in social studies reveals a logic of justification (Barbie, 2015).
Questions on social studies refer to “the nature of reality”, “the relationship between
investigator and object”, and “the definition of the truth” (Smith & Heshusius, 1986).
To obtain knowledge concealed in social phenomena, two ideologies steer specific
strategies and approaches when conducting social studies. The one persisted by
naturalists is deduction, and the other is induction upheld by interpretivists. The
naturalists believe that knowledge exists in the world and waits to be uncovered
(Asvoll, 2014). In practice, deductive research strictly follows principles, hypotheses
and processes and is set in the beginning, and employs positivism and functionalism
ways to look for veritas (Barbie, 2015). Social studies, in comparison, comprise the
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plethora of subjectively individual meaningfulness. Accordingly, interpretivists argue
that social realities can be better understood in contexts (Asvoll, 2014). Thus social
researchers develop inductive means to analyze social phenomena.
As to specific approaches of investigation, there are overlapped areas between
deductive and inductive studies. For example, both can use interview and secondary
resources to access data. The largest difference, nonetheless, is the purpose of using
data (Seale, 2012). Deductive research is dedicated to identifying the relationship of
variables laid in hypotheses to test theories, while inductive research is committed to
investigating contexts through narrating and interpreting individual stances on social
affairs to, critically, generate case-appropriate theories (Seale, 2012).
One of the representatives of inductive research in social studies is case study
that provides in-depth viewpoints regarding certain social affairs through conducting
qualitative research. George and Bennett (2005) points the merits of case study as a
valid method for social studies. First, it can “achieve highly conceptual validity, and
accommodate contextual factors in flexibility” (p.19). Second, it can “foster new
hypotheses” (p.19). Third, it can provide a close investigation on casual mechanisms.
Specifically, some cases have idiographic casual mechanisms, which cannot be found
in other cases. Case studies, therefore, can “discover casual mechanisms to broaden
understanding of empirical social issues” (p.21, 22). Last, as argued by George and
Bennett (2005), and Walton (1992), the method of case studies assists to probe social
phenomena and identify explanatory factors, which may be overlooked previously.
This study sheds light on IEO and policy issues in two cities, Beijing and Shenzhen,
with different political, economic and demographic features. In light of the analytical
perspective, deep viewpoints of migrants are of foremost importance. So a qualitative
research is an appropriate mode to answer the research questions.
Without doubt, any research method has shortcomings. Case studies are argued
as a method that “lack academic rigor”, “is regarded as inferior to rigorous methods”
and “lack specific guidelines for collecting and analyzing data” (Meyer, 2001, p.348).
And there are critics arguing that an agreed definition and purpose of case studies
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have not been constructed, compared to the common agreement on case studies as a
design and a data collection process (Cook & Campbell, 1979; Meyer, 2001). Given
this unclear status, researchers need to be cautious and clear about the “interpretation
of case studies and purpose of carrying out particular studies” (Meyer, 2001, p.349).
In light of the points by Yin (2017), the factor deciding on the choice of case studies
refers to research questions. By using the method, an illustrative case study should be
able to explore sensitive and ill-defined concepts. In light of the research questions, 1)
under the context of hukou decentralization, what are policies conceived by the local
governments to manage educational opportunities for migrant students in Beijing and
Shnzhen; and 2) how effective these policies are in equalizing educational
opportunities for migrant students in these two cities, the method of case studies
offers insights of migrants on policy effects. Despite this study lacks comprehensive
reviews on the cases by statistical methods, in-depth viewpoints can reach the points
that used to be neglected. Also, to overcome the shortcomings, this research refers to
second hand statistical resources as the background component, which betters off the
research background discourse.
4.3 Case Studies of Beijing and Shenzhen
In the Background section, with reference to discourses on “return to
education” and “school expansion”, critical indicators incorporating “GDP Per
Capita”, “PCDI”, and “the quantity of primary schools” have been listed to present
the status quo of these two research sites generally. In this section, the political and
economic standings as well as demographic figures with an exclusive emphasis on
migrants of these two sites are covered. By reviewing these secondary documents, a
macro-context is clarified, and the necessity and rationality of conducting a city-level
comparative study in the issue of IEO under the influence of policies and regulations
of the hukou system.
4.3.1 Beijing
Located in the northern part of China, and heading in the Jing-Jin-Ji region that
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is the nucleus of Bohai Economic Rim, the capital of the country, Beijing, alongside
Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing, is one of the municipalities under the jurisdiction
of the central government (zhongyang zhixia shi). Due to its unique political standing,
Beijing has been the political, cultural, economic, and international association center
of China since the CPC took over the right of govern in 1949. Prior to the 1980s, the
population movements like many other social aspects were centrally planned across
the country, which gives China a special place in sociological discussion areas such
as transformation of social structure, civilization, urbanization and migration (Gu &
Shen, 2003; Logan, 2002).
Alongside the collapse of the planned economic system and the expansion of the
“open door” policy, constrains on population movement had been gradually loosened
in Beijing till 2010 when the growth rate of total population dropped sharply for the
first time since 2000 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2018). This is a result of political
designs regarding reurbanization proposing to reshuffle non-capital functional zones.
As a result, the number of non-local hukou residents in the capital increased till 2015
when the number of non-local hukou residents decreased for the first time since 1999
(Hong, Yin & Ma, 2018).

Figure 4.1 The changing trend of the number and percentage of non-local hukou
permanent population in Beijing.
Note: Y-axis (left) refers to the number of population (unit: million); Y-axis (right)
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refers to the percentage of non-local hukou permanent population accounted for the
total population (unit: P.C./%); X-axis refers to years.
Source: Beijing Statistics Yearbook 2018 (Beijing Municipal Bureau of Statistics,
2018); Blue Book of Population in Beijing (Hong, Yin & Ma, 2018).

The number of non-local hukou permanent population in Beijing reached the
peak with 8.22 million in 2015 (Beijing Municipal Bureau of Statistics, 2019).
Though the increasing trend seems to be stopped since 2016, the number of non-local
hukou permanent population still accounted for over 35 per cent by the end of 2018
(Beijing Municipal Bureau of Statistics, 2019). This group of residents is critical
when the government considers to revise relevant welfare policies and programs, and
their voice and benefits concerned cannot be ignored. Compared to other megacities
of the country, accessing compulsory education in Beijing has been more challenging
for a long period of time due to the city’s unique political role and other peripheral
situations such as public security, environmental issues, and stability of social
structure alongside the rapid industrialization, urbanization, and motorization (Liu &
Jacob, 2013; Scharping, 2013; Zhang, Wang, Hao, Wang, Wang, Chai & Li, 2016).
As what discussed in the Chapter 2, the number of primary schools was decreased in
the city in 2018 with 984 including 59 private schools merely that deem the hukou
condition as insignificance (Beijing Municipal Government, 2018). Nearly a decade
ago when non-local hukou permanent population mounted up, the scope of primary
schools of the city was over 1,100 (Beijing Municipal Bureau of Statistics, 2010).
4.3.2 Shenzhen
The CPC Central Committee promulgated an instruction recently that supports to
build Shenzhen into a socialist demonstration zone (State Council, 2019). This policy
further authenticates the uniqueness and importance of the first SEZ, and underlines
the all-round reforms to take place in the city that covers not only further opening-up
in its economic system, but deeper reforms in the people’s livelihood. The instruction
explicitly indicates that “a good quality of education” system needs to be established
and demonstrates other cities from this campaign (State Council, 2019). Shenzhen,
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from a fishing village four decades ago, becomes a megacity and the Chinese Silicon
Valley on the basis of its world-leading innovative capacity. Besides, it is also known
that migrants consist of population majority of the city. Thus what can be anticipated
is that more people will flow into the city for a high degree of civilization, and more
positive possibilities of future with the favorable tendency of this emerging national
policy.

Figure 4.2 The changing trend of the number and percentage of non-local hukou
permanent population in Shenzhen.
Note: Y-axis (left) refers to the number of population (unit: million); Y-axis (right)
refers to the percentage of non-local hukou permanent population accounted for the
total population (unit: P.C./%); X-axis refers to years.
Source: Shenzhen Statistical Yearbook 2019 (Statistics Bureau of Shenzhen
Municipality, 2019).

It is explicit that, compared to Beijing, migrants are the main force of Shenzhen.
The quantity of non-local hukou residents increased with a slight deduction between
2010 and 2015 and reached the peak with 8.18 million out of 12.52 million in total
(Statistics Bureau of Shenzhen Municipality, 2019). With the patronage of favorable
national policies under the demonstration zone proposal and its existing economic
pattern, Shenzhen keeps magnetizing people over the country to work, live and settle
down. In order to satisfy its residents to access basic education, the government
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subjectively supports the development of compulsory education, which can be
revealed from the expansion in the scope of basic educational institutes. The number
of primary schools was 342 in 2017, steadily increasing from 226 in 1979 (Statistics
Bureau of Shenzhen Municipality, 2018). In the meantime, the government has
considerably launched 1,683 kindergartens by the end of 2017 to satiate the
preschool educational expectation of young couples, which is larger nearly three
times than 2000 (Statistics Bureau of Shenzhen Municipality, 2019).
In light of political standings and demographic features of the two research sites,
it is indisputable that Beijing and Shenzhen possess dozens of differences and these
differences certainly jam educational opportunities for migrants amid the influence of
the hukou system. It is uncontroversial, meanwhile, that conducing social studies in
China needs to weigh and consider the matter of country’s characteristics in diversity.
Since there are a tons of studies in literature with reference to large sampling sources
or national surveys that presented adequately and statistically the matters of IEO and
other aspects of educational inequality at a national level, this research is designed to
dig into insights from stakeholders on IEO with influence of policies and regulations
of the hukou system. It is believed that a comparative study referring to two cities as
study cases with entirely distinctive contexts is meaningful and necessary to supply a
want of literature. This research can draw an integrate picture that indicates effects of
policies and regulations within the hukou system on addressing issues of IEO among
migrants.
4.4 Data
4.4.1 Sampling
This policy-based and qualitative-orientated research employs two approaches to
enrich the sample size - homogeneous sampling and snowball sampling. First, there
are two non-probability sampling techniques commonly used in research to select a
sample of subjects from a certain part of population, which are convenience sampling
and purposive sampling (Etikan, Musa & Alkassim, 2016). When randomization
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becomes impossible, non-probability sampling becomes enfranchised with extreme
usefulness (Etikan et al., 2016). In consideration of the nature of this research, social
backgrounds of informants restrain the possibility of approaching randomly as many
as population who are eligible to be involved in the research. Besides, in view of the
research questions, the sample size is not of foremost importance while the depth of
information provided is a more crucial element in this research. In addition, due to
limited time, workforce and resources, this research can actualize is to maximize the
benefits of contents from a kind circle of informants. So non-probability sampling
methods are proper, available and profitable based on the logic of research template.
Second, convenience sampling is a tactic to collect data when targeted population is
willing to participate (Dornyei, 2007). The convenience sampling is a blow-off and
affordable strategy to conduct fieldwork. However, the most evident disadvantage of
it is bias (Mackey & Gass, 2005). So convenience sampling may not be able to
convince others to accept findings generated from a comparatively less trustworthy
and poorer data collection method (Etikan et al., 2016). In order to gain information
from them effectively, purposive sampling was used for data collection accordingly.
Purposive sampling enables researchers to find informants in research activities
(Bernard, 2002). People who are well-informed and possess a phenomenon of shared
interests are waiting to be identified and selected by researchers. (Cresswell & Plano
Clark, 2011).
In general, there are seven specific types of purposive sampling techniques used
frequently in literature, 1) maximum variation sampling; 2) homogeneous sampling,
3) typical case sampling; 4) extreme/deviant case sampling, 5) critical case sampling,
6) total population sampling, and 7) expert sampling (Etikan et al., 2016). In
consideration of questions and goals of the research, and feasibility of implementing
the fieldwork, homogeneous sampling is more proper and adoptable technique to be
used for data collection. Homogeneous sampling focus on a kind group of population
with shared traits and characteristics. The purpose of using this purposive sampling
technique is to focus on similarities of the targeted population and link information
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provided to the topic of the study (Etikan et al., 2016). This research concentrates on
IEO perplexing migrant students in Beijing and Shenzhen. A common trait of these
students refers to hukou status.
Apart from homogeneous sampling, the other technique used for data collection
in this research is snowball sampling that is “the most widely employed method of
sampling in qualitative research” (Noy, 2008, p.330). As a main vehicle, snowball
sampling assists researchers to enrich sampling clusters (Voy, 2008). Snowball
sampling functions through a particular “sampling tree” that indicates the course of
sampling process (Noy, 2008). In a dynamic interaction in a social context, snowball
sampling plays a role as a representative of dynamic processes. Straightforwardly, in
the beginning of a study, researchers need to find few informants on their own, and
these people belong to the targeted group of population with characteristics. Then,
researchers used to seek assistance from approached informants to offer information
of other people they know, so that researchers identify whether these new informants
are qualified to be informants of this research.

Figure 4.3 Snowball stemma.
Source: Noy (2008, p.333).
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The Figure 4.3 presents a snowball stemma illustrating the types of information
conveyed through a snowball deign, in which names and genders of family members
created (Noy, 2008). In this static depiction, there are four networks of information: 1)
generational position; 2) referrals providing information; 3) referrals referring other
informants; and 4) interview time (Noy, 2008). A combination of independent and
dependent socio-demographic features creates “a wealth of contextualized social
information” (Noy, 2008, p.333). This research does not have a want to reflect the
contents of this depiction entirely, while the logic of expanding the scope of
potentially proper informants resembles.
With the guidance of the two techniques, homogeneous sampling and snowball
sampling, there are 29 informants in total who were qualified and willing to assist
and successfully completed the process of interviews, among which there are 15 in
Beijing and 14 in Shenzhen, respectively. The following table contains the relevant
and necessary background information of the informants.

Categories

Beijing

Shenzhen Sub-total

1. Children's School-year
Preschool

6

4

10

Primary

9

10

19

Planning to Public School

6

1

7

Planning to Private School

0

3

3

Private

0

6

6

Public

9

4

13

Non-local

15

12

27

Local (transformed)

0

2

2

Yes

12

10

22

No

3

4

7

Yes

0

14

14

No

15

0

15

1.1 Going to School Plan (for those in preschool)

1.2 School Type (for those already in primary school)

2. Hukou Status

2.1 hukou conversion Plan (for non-local)

3. Financing Assisted (regardless of the type and amount)
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4. Local Housing Purchased
Yes

1

0

1

No

14

14

28

Hukou Status

15

5

20

Housing

0

9

9

4.1 Determinatives for Education Access

Table 4.1 Background information of the informants.
Source: author’s own work.

4.4.2 Collection
Based on the sampling strategies, there are three phases of the first-hand sources
collected from the fieldwork, which took place from October to December 2019.
What deserves a note is that second-hand data including policy documents that were
scrutinized alongside the fieldwork, although the largest workload of documentation
had been done before October 2019, which assisted to induct an interview framework
and questions that expected feedback from the participants.
In the first phase of the fieldwork, several pilot studies had been done with some
individuals who are qualified and willing to share information. The primary goal of it
is to form an overview of the context related to the research topic and get me familiar
with how ordinary people think of IEO and policies derived from the decentralized
hukou system. Thus there were few structured questions but an open-ended question,
for example, what are your thoughts on educational inequality and its relation with
the hukou system? By conducting these pilot studies, I designed the semi-structured
interview framework that syncretizes feedback and my own reflections from reading
policy documents.
The first phase of the fieldwork cannot be reckoned as an unalloyed process for
data collection. And the practice of implementing pilot studies is a preparation for the
interview template. In the second phase of the fieldwork, which majorly took place in
November 2019, according to the information of potentially eligible interviewees
provided by my sister living in Beijing and a former classmate living in Shenzhen. I
approached to the first batch of five interviewees (two from Beijing and three from
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Shenzhen) by WeChat. At the end of each interview, I raised an assistance to them
regarding whether they could provide contact information of others who they though
were eligible to participate in the research. Following the manner of enlarging the
sample size, I approached potential informants and successfully interviewed most of
them.
In December 2019, when I started transferring the first-hand data into transcripts
for analysis, I found few of them contained unclear contents recorded in the audios.
In order to clarify them, I reapproached relevant informants for regaining their views
concerned. This was the third phase of this semi-structured interview. By conducting
the fieldwork, the data hosting got flourished. After completing the fieldwork by the
end of December 2019, I began to text the data in the transcript and categorize them
into two themes: financing and regulation.
4.4.3 Analysis
This study used thematic analysis for data analysis. Thematic analysis refers to
the extraction of themes and is a diffuse mean to define core themes in a data hosting
with few agreed principles (Graue, 2015). By employing thematic analysis approach,
findings can be simplified and interpretations of comparing and contrasting cases is
easy-doing (Ma, 2018).
Thematic analysis is a grounding strategy for data analysis in qualitative studies.
There are many different specific methods to be used for the entire process. Among
these, the initial step of analyzing data is to figure down how to code. Thus thematic
coding becomes a widely used way for data coding and is embodied as zigzag coding,
open coding, and inductive and deductive coding. And coding methods of qualitative
studies are interlaced commonly. Exemplified by the point of Seale, Gobo, Gubrium
and Silverman (2004) indicated, combining different coding ways symptomatizes
how a process of data analysis is complex and necessary. Thereby this research was
depending on open coding, inductive coding, and deductive coding methods to
showcase the logic behind data lied on the manuscript.
In this research, open coding method was used initially in which data were coded
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in sentence, line, and paragraph. By using the open coding method, the contents of
the transcripts were regarded on same weight. Furthermore, inductive coding was
used so that the two themes could be excavated and labeled. Based on the labels by
sought, the conceptual framework was manifested through deductive coding method,
which is particularly meaningful for the study context and literature. One of critical
reasons of employing deductive coding is that this research is not to examine specific
theories but to enrich theoretical discussions on the effectiveness of decentralization
strategies disputed in literature, by referring to the practical case of the hukou system
in the Chinese social context.
Technically, in this research, I used NVivo software for data process and analysis.
By relying on it, the data were tagged with codes and clustered representing different
themes. According to the textbook, themes constructed hierarchically elaborated the
research questions in a more integrated manner. For instance, the informants of this
research are migrant students’ parents. Whereby each of these informants was tagged
with a code, which means that their feedback was separately treated and the contents
formed by information provided by them were stored and used to interpret by the
author according to the characteristics of coding patterns.
4.4.4 Validity
In general, it is well known that validity issues refer to internal and external one.
Internal validity concentrates on researchers own in what degree the difference exists
between practicality and imagination (Campbell, 1986). In contrast, external validity
mainly comes out in fieldwork, particularly, at time of interacting with informants
(Campbell, 1986). This requests researchers not only to avoid preoccupation and bias
in the research deigning procedure, but to skillfully provide a comfortable and
reliable manner to approach informants.
To ensure the quality of data and the integration of information, in general, there
are two methods used to enhance the validity of sources collected. The first one is to
keep contacting with interviewees before the result of analysis unleashed. This gave
me opportunities to revise misunderstanding and missing parts of information that
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was shared by the participants. In detailed, I messaged all participants by WeChat
and sought whether they would like to look through contents that were transcribed.
Based on their willingness, I circulated relevant transcripts to them for their readings.
There were information added by these informants indeed through proofreading, and
the authenticity of first-hand data was double secured.
Apart from the feedback sought, I deem guidance from supervisors and opinions
from peers are critical for bettering off the quality of data. In the process of study, my
chief supervisor was enthusiastic about the progress, and so I got many opportunities
to be guided by him in terms of the data quality and relevant issues. In the mean time,
discussions with peers on methodological issues always benefited my research. This
peer-interaction certainly assisted me to review and modify the shortcomings in the
process of data collection and analysis.
4.5 Research Ethics
Ethics is a non-disgraceful component, which deserves extra concerns. Bryman
(2016) lists the following disciplines that are core illustrations of research ethics: 1)
no harmful intends or behaviors to respondents; 2) to get consent and agreement in
the beginning of research; 3) no cheating to respondents in any case; and 4) no
leaking or invading privacy and personal information of respondents.
In order to equalize the position between the informants and me as the researcher,
I made an explicit statement before formal discussions. First, this research excludes
personal demographic information including age, race, religion and marriage. Thus
there was no chance access the privacy of respondents. second, an instruction letter
with the intends and contents of this research, and ways and duration of interviewing
was forwarded to interviewees for reading and agreeing. Since each informant is not
acquaintance of the researcher, “obligation” or “order” did not exist throughout the
interviews. Voluntary was the basic tenet in interviewing process. Last but not least,
the participants were given a promise with an absolute freedom to retreat in any time
as long as they felt uncomfortable with either questions or communication manners.
Accordingly, not only were potential troubles concerning research ethics prevented,
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but the reliability of sources was reinforced.
4.6 Research Design Limitations
As aforementioned parts discussed, the method of case study has shortcomings.
Particularly the sample size is the criticizing point when case studies try to persuade
outsiders to reply on the case for better understandings on macro contexts. Yin (1981)
points three arguments against the method of case study, including “a lack of rigour”,
“little basis for scientific generalization” and “the unreliability of producing massive
documentations”. Foremost among these criticisms, social scientists conclude that
the most common-agreed disadvantage of the method of case study is its dependency
a single or single-cluster case exploration weakening capacity to generalize universal
conclusions (Tellis, 1997). Compared to those replying on second-hand sources from
databases and a first-hand questionnaire approach, the sample size is not as large as
enough to present a general conclusion. Besides, this research excludes upper social
class as a control group for information sharing, which may lead into a fragmentary
argument when discussing the effectiveness of hukou system and its decentralization
reforms. Therefore, further research agendas in this topic would need to tackle these
methodological issues, accordingly.
This methodology chapter presents detailed philosophies and steps of proceeding
this research. Based on the strategies of researching the cases, the findings of this
research are produced and presented in the following chapter.
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Chapter 5 FINDINGS
This chapter uncovers the primary findings by introducing two sections. The first
section details certain specific perceptions from the informants of the two cities. With
reference to the details shared by the informants, the second part of this chapter, with
reflective discussions on the findings, concludes a dual-polarization model
embodying the differentiation of the two cities, and presents a developed conceptual
framework integrated the reflections on the findings.
5.1 Comparative Results
The section refers to detailed comparisons between the two cities in financing
and regulation respectively. To link the primary research question, it is necessary to
re-display the conceptual framework that implicates the stronger affiliation among
the theoretical inquiry, the primary research question and the major findings.

A Better-off and Worse-off Education Context
Change?
Financing + Regulation

Decentralization Tactics in Education Governance under the Context of Hukou
Decentralization

Figure 5.1 Conceptual framework.
Source: author’s own work.

Taking into account of the literature debate over effectiveness of decentralization
in developed regions, and the institutionalized hukou system that is criticized for its
inequality of educational services for migrant students, this conceptual framework
focuses on the former one by examining specific policies under the environment of
decentralization reforms in the hukou system. In what follows, the viewpoints from
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migrants in financing and regulation policies form into implications on the research
questions.
Prior to the detailed analyses, it is imperative to overview what requirements are
for migrant students being eligible to apply for basic education in these two cities. As
this research sheds light on primary education, the following table lists the relevant
information regarding the eligibility for primary education access in these two cities.

Application Requirements for Primary Education (Migrant Students)
Public

Beijing

Private

1. Family Hukou Booklet

1. Health Certificate

2. Permanent Residence Certificate

2. Permanent Residence Certificate

3. Temporary Residence Permit

3. Temporary Residence Permit

4. Employment Proof

4. Employment Proof

5. Non-guardianship Proof in Place of Domicile
6. Age 6+

5. Non-guardianship Proof in Place of
Domicile
6. Age 6+

*Meet al.L the Requirements
1. Local Hukou Students
2. Children of Preferential Policies Recipients

Shenzhen

3. Non-local Hukou Students with One of the Parents Holding Local Hukou
4. Non-local Hukou Students with One of the Parents Holding Residence Permit, Being
Employed and Paying One-year Social Insurance
*Meet One of the Requirements

Table 5.1 The application eligibility for primary education by migrant students
Source: Beijing Municipal Education Commission (2020); Shenzhen Education
Bureau (2020)
What can present from this table is that 1) in Beijing, the requirement difference
between public and private education locates at the hukou differentiation; and 2) the
Shenzhen government eases requirements by referring to much fewer items than the
Beijing government. In this regard, migrant students in Shenzhen should feel less
stressed in choosing primary education, no matter what their hukou types are. In the
following parts, the detailed discussions based on the viewpoints of the informants
can test not only the differentiation of the two cities in using hukou decentralization
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to manage educational admission for migrant students, but also unveil the realities in
terms of how the informants view the government actions.
5.1.1 Financing: Sponsorship Spending and Subsidy Receiving
In light of the primary research question, how effective these policies (with
regard to financing and regulation) are in equalizing educational opportunities for
migrant students in these two cities, what needs further explanation is that public
finance for compulsory education differs in different cities, there are few golden
standards used to examine whether a general financing scheme is sufficient for the
overall development of basic education, such as financial commitment to
infrastructure in education sectors. Also, it is not reasonable to argue the degree of
equality in basic education according to the number of schools, despite the number
matters in providing more choices to students. This research sheds light on whether
migrant students are sponsored financially by government to dig into the
differentiation of financing policies in the two cities. Besides, financing comparisons
in this research remains in private schools exclusively. This is because not only in the
two research sites, but also all cities in China, public compulsory education has been
operated by the “free-tuition” model since 2008 (State Council, 2008). Thus it is
pointless to include the cases of public schools.
In Beijing, as what mentioned in this chapter, going to private primary schools is
financial burdens to grassroots migrant families. This is because: 1) there are few
institutionalized financial assistance schemes projected for students in private
schools; 2) apart from “sponsorship packages”, for students intending to access better
private schools, there are “intermediary fees” charged by “agents”.
Financially, the situation in the capital for migrant students is harsh. The Beijing
Municipal Education Commission (BMEC hereinafter) is a government body being
in charge of compulsory education of the city. In October 2017, BMEC promulgated
a reviewed policy related to “subsidy” for students receiving compulsory education.
The “subsidy”, yet, simply refers to living affairs of boarding schools’ students
(BMEC, 2017). The policy fixes four types of qualified “beneficiary”, and the rate
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was set as 300 yuan per month for each primary-school student and the “subsidy” is
provided for ten months of a year (BMEC, 2017). Clearly, regardless of the content
of the policy which indeed includes local and migrant students, the amount of the
“subsidy” is little compared to the level of commodity prices in the city. Besides, the
“subsidy” is set only for living affairs, but the amount of tuition in private schools is
much larger than living costs. In terms of whether there are “tuition subsidies” for
migrant students, the interviewees replied as below:
“...I am not clear about whether there is ‘subsidy’...” (BJ-1st9 interviewee).
“...I do not think there are ‘subsidies’ for migrant students...” (BJ-2nd
interviewee).
“...there is no financial assistance...going to private schools depends on
parents...” (BJ-4th interviewee).
“...it is ridiculous...if you can go to private schools, you do not concern or
care about that little ‘subsidy’...” (BJ-5th interviewee).
“...as I know, there is relevant policies...” (BJ-9th interviewee).
“...I know the living ‘subsidy’, but the amount is nothing...tuition matters
much...” (BJ-11th interviewee).
In a word, although the perceptions shared by the 15 interviewees in Beijing are
different, all of them never heard of “tuition subsidy” for migrant students. The result
of searching policies was in vain as well. In other words, the Beijing government has
not promulgated any influential financial assistance scheme to reduce migrant
families’ financial burden in tuition costs of private education. An impressive
observation, as what BJ-5th interviewee shared, is that in consideration of the
amount of expenses in private schools and of the living “subsidy”, the rich do not
concern both while the grassroots just cannot afford the amount of tuition costs. In
other words, the “better-off” and “worse-off” context proposed in the conceptual
framework has not been changed but institutionalized in private education in Beijing.
As the interviews were conducted anonymously, the interviewees were labeled with ordinals,
e.g. 1st, 2nd... Prior to ordinals, there is either BJ- or SZ-. Amongst the both, BJ- means
interviewees were from Beijing and SZ- represents interviewees were from Shenzhen
9
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Comparatively, the Shenzhen government earns the praises for its financing
assistance policies. According to the latest stipulation, students receiving compulsory
education in private schools are eligible for annual subsidy rated 7,000 yuan for
primary students and 9,000 yuan for middle school students (Shenzhen Education
Bureau, 2019). This subsidy is applicable to not only local but non-local students,
and further extends the eligibility to the Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan students.
Moreover, the criteria of receiving the subsidy are same for local and non-local
students (Shenzhen Education Bureau, 2019). In the mean time, in order to alleviate
financial burden to families with economic difficulty, the Shenzhen government
revised living subsidy policies from two points: 1) including non-boarding students
with financial difficulty; 2) increasing the subsidy to 1,000 yuan per year for
non-local students (Shenzhen Education Bureau, 2019). Compared to the Beijing’s
similar policy mentioned above, not only is the amount larger, but the scope of
eligibility is wider.
According to the feedback from the interviewees, almost each of them knows the
policy and gives credits on it.
“...there is subsidy in private schools...it works well...” (SZ-1st interviewee).
“...the amount of subsidy helps non-local students...in some poorer private
schools where expenses are not that high, it can covers the tuition
fees...which makes migrants feel that we are one of the city and not
excluded...” (SZ-4th interviewee).
“...as long as you are recruited by schools, almost every student can get
money from the government...even in some schools, the amount of subsidy
equals the tuition fees, which means students do not need to spend extra
money in private schools...” (SZ-8th interviewee).
“...the subsidy makes us feel there is no much difference between going to
public and private schools...parents do not need to worry financial issues
much, which helps us to save money for extra education provisions for our
kids to improve the quality of education...” (SZ-13th interviewee).
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Apparently, the differentiation in financing practices in the two cities is huge.
For many migrant students who are not the priority for public education, private
education becomes the option if families intend to settle in the city. Based on the
interviewees’ responses, financial burden hence becomes a realistic issue for
grassroots migrant families that account for the majority of non-local residents.
Subsidy policies can equalize education opportunities to make migrants feel that
there is no enormous difference between private and public education in terms of
tuition costs. In other words, subsidies from government can solve IEO problems
financially so that parents and students would not face a hard-decision situation when
choosing compulsory education. In this regard, policies and practices by the
Shenzhen government evidence the betterment than the Beijing government. In light
of the conceptual framework, the “better-off” and “worse-off” educational context is
financially changed by subsidy policies in Shenzhen, while the context is further and
institutionalized in Beijing.
5.1.2 Regulation: Examination of Hukou Conversion Practices
The second analytical perspective of the conceptual framework refers to
regulation. This part sheds light on public compulsory education and unveils the
possibility and difficulty of getting into public schools by migrant students. This is
because going to private schools does not require local hukou, as one criterion. It is
pointless to include private schools for narrative analysis.
Decentralization brings the flexibility to local governments in making
appropriate public policies according to local circumstances (Wu, 2013). Alongside
urbanization and the movement of population, social structure has been transformed
dramatically in urban China (Chan & Zhang, 1999; Cheng & Selden, 1994).
Educational provision encounters a situation with increasing demands as a result of
population growth in, particularly, non-local hukou residents. Thus the competition in
accessing basic education between local and non-local hukou residents becomes
fierce.
By alleviating IEO problems and trying to equalize education for residents, cities
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with people inflow promulgated the “point-based system” (PBS hereinafter), “talents
recruitment scheme” (TRS), “professionals recruitment scheme” (PRS) and “special
contributors recruitment scheme” (SCRS) to enable the non-local to get local hukou.
Except PBS, other schemes target at middle and upper social class.
In consideration of accessing education, as the BJ-5th interviewee shared: “...the
rich does not concern hukou...they used to prefer the greatest private education as the
target of families is for overseas higher education...” Therefore, in this research, all
interviewees belongs to the social group of “salariat” (wage-earner class) and are not
“bourgeois”, these schemes are not applicable to most of them. As a result, alongside
the “local-first” rule, PBS is proposed as the top priority of changing hukou status to
accessing basic education in public schools. In what follows, the practices of PBS in
Beijing and Shenzhen are examined to check whether this policy assists in alleviating
IEO problems in the two cities.
In 2016, Beijing Municipal Commission of Development and Reform (BMCDR
hereinafter) promulgated its PBS as its “4+2+7” policy framework (BMCDR, 2016).
The following table presents the details of the contents of this framework.

The "4+2+7"Policy Framework（PBS）
"4" - qualifications

"2" - basic requirements

"7“ - credit-earned points

1. local residential permit;

1. legal and stable employment 1. education

2. not older than statutory retirement
2. legal and stable residence
age;

2. residence and working area

3. uninterruptedly pay social
insurance fees not less than seven
years

3. innovation and carving-out

4. without criminal records

4. tax payment
5. age
6. honors and awards
7. law-abiding records

Figure 5.2 The “4+2+7” policy framework, Beijing’s PBS.
Source: Beijing Municipal Commission of Development and Reform (2016).
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The “4+2+7” policy framework has been the major referred official document
for the majority of non-local hukou residents with planning of changing hukou status
and getting Beijing hukou. In the aforementioned chapters, it is known that Chinese
hukou institution has characteristics of inheritance, which indicates that parents’
hukou status determines children’s hukou identity (Fan, 2008). Children’s educational
prospect therefore depends on parents’ hukou status according to the way of the
hukou system operation in education. Alongside the “local-first” rule in practices of
public education admission, transforming non-local into local hukou has become the
optimal means of accessing public education. Theoretically, the “4+2+7” policy
framework offers chance for grassroots migrants, as its categories in “4” and “2”
were set in an inclusive range. And with reference to the interviewees, most of
non-local residents in the city are eligible to apply for hukou conversion indeed.
“...we certainly want to transform into local hukou...it benefits not only our
kid’s education, but many living respects...according to the policy, we are
eligible to apply for local hukou...” (BJ-1st interviewee).
“...we need to wait for two years more to meet the age requirement. Apart
from it, other requirements for eligibility of transformation are met...”
(BJ-3rd interviewee).
“...in consideration of reality, we look forward to Beijing hukou...if only
talking about ‘eligibility’, both my husband and me are eligible...I think
most people eligible in the current policy environment...” (BJ-4th
interviewee).
Based on the researcher’s observation, “4” and “2” refer to “eligibility” implying
that non-local residents can be included in this policy framework if they meet the six
basic requirements. Except the item of “paying social insurance not less than seven
years uninterruptedly”, which is a barrier only for young couples and new migrants,
other items are applicable to most of non-local residents in Beijing. In addition, the
time bar for social insurance payment is not a technical barrier and those planning for
hukou conversion can overcome with patience. The practical difficulty of hukou
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conversion in Beijing inheres in the “7” (credit-earned points), which, exclusively, is
a category ranking applicants and determining the result of hukou conversion directly.
In other words, the seven items are the substances differing “eligibility” and
“possibility” in hukou conversion practices in Beijing.
In consideration of the ranking practices, hukou conversion and PBS turn into a
substance that is touchable but inaccessible for grassroots migrants.
“...it is impossible to transform into local hukou for us at present...it is not
about money, but the regulation...I guess there could be one out of ten
applicants who can be selected according to the requirements...the
possibility is extremely low...” (BJ-6th interviewee).
“...if we can get Beijing hukou by spending one or two million yuan, we
would try...but the surveillance mechanism is really strict, plus the
anti-corruption movement, it cannot be solved by money...” (BJ-7th
interviewee).
“...as I know, the number of those transforming into Beijing hukou is quite
little...the requirement is too strict for most of migrants to meet...and the
government re-strengthens the practices of hukou conversion recently...”
(BJ-8th interviewee).
“...there are too many barriers...based on our circumstance, it is still not
possible despite we can wait our kid to upgrade to high school...it is too
difficult for ordinary people to transform hukou, as the speed of credit
accumulation for us is too tardy...” (BJ-10th interviewee).
“...PBS is not the most efficient way to transform hukou...even though you
have personal property, which means buying a flat in Beijing does not
secure Beijing hukou, like us...you need to have collective hukou (jiti hukou)
first, which means you need to work in SOEs or government organizations,
and then having a property. But for most of migrants, there is no
opportunities of working in such organizations with quotas for migrants to
transform hukou status...besides, buying a flat in the city is more difficult
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for ‘wage-earners’...”(BJ-11th interviewee).
“...for those who can be selected in the process of hukou conversion, they
are professionals and have strong social networks...having Beijing hukou is
pretty easy to them...but for most of the grassroots, the requirements are too
detailed and refer to many aspects...you may meet one item, but fail to meet
another one...so the process is tricky, and makes us feel the government has
no sincere to help the majority of the public in the case...” (BJ-12th
interviewee).
In a word, “eligibility” and “possibility” of hukou conversion in Beijing differ at
a large scale. Questing for public compulsory education by grassroots migrants in
Beijing by changing hukou status seems little possible in practice, the PBS stipulates
the “eligibility” laxly though. Comparatively, hukou conversion is easy-practising for
grassroots migrants in Shenzhen. But having Shenzhen hukou is not the solely top
priority for students accessing public compulsory education.
Shenzhen has its own PBS in 2012, which is earlier than Beijing’s promulgation
in the case. The supreme purpose of PBS is to attract labors and further flourish the
economy (Shenzhen Government, 2012). Due to its population structure, Shenzhen
had been encountering the deficit of labor-force in two sessions (the first decade in
the “open-door” policy implementation, and the first decade since China accepted by
the WTO), as a result of its economic rapid development (Wen, 2017). Alongside the
mandate of turning into a demonstration zone in economy and social administration,
the Shenzhen government has been dedicated to collecting skilled labors. Initially,
the PBS is viewed as a “labor-collection” policy and targets at living arrangements
for non-local residents.
This policy framework indeed benefits grassroots migrants in Shenzhen. As
same as Beijing in terms of “eligibility” in hukou conversion, except its age
requirement narrowing the scope of “eligibility”, the most influential factor is “the
length of social insurance payment”. In Beijing, the time bar need to be seven years
or more, while in Shenzhen, residents are able to be included with a one-year social
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insurance

payment

record

(Shenzhen

Government,

2012).

Moreover,

the

“credit-earned points” category exhibits more items for residents to accumulate
points. All of these creates a relaxed policy context for non-local residents and assist
migrants to root in the city. Most of interviewees from Shenzhen eulogize the PBS
which in practice eases their concerns in hukou conversion.

Shenzhen PBS

Credit-earned points

Requirements for “eligibility”

1. education
2. professionalism
3. competition, honors and awards
4. innovation and patent
5. carving-out and the amount of
business income tax
6. length of residence
7. length of social insurance payment
8. social services

1. age between 18 and 48
2. healthy
3. high school graduate or above
4. residential permit and paid
social insurance
5. abiding national laws
6. no criminal records

Figure 5.3 Shenzhen’s PBS.
Source: Shenzhen Government (2012).

“...the situation of turning non-local hukou into local one becomes more
inclusive for migrants...the policy has been loosened in the past years...”
(SZ-2nd interviewee).
“...PBS is the quickest means of getting Shenzhen hukou...and it becomes
more humanized...” (SZ-4th interviewee).
“...for my age, we worried about education that might be a barrier for us to
have Shenzhen hukou...but now the government recognizes different ways
of uplifting education background such as adult high education...which can
facilitate the chance of hukou conversion for the middle aged particularly...”
(SZ-5th interviewee).
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“...in general, it is not difficult to transform hukou in Shenzhen as I
know...many of my friends got Shenzhen hukou in recent years...” (SZ-13th
interviewee).
Based on the messages, hukou conversion in Shenzhen has been more feasible
for migrants. However, in practice, what differs from Beijing, where the “local-first”
rule has been insisted strictly, is that having Shenzhen hukou cannot guarantee a
place in public schools. What determining the priority of accessing public education
in Shenzhen is the status of residence (homeownership).
“...at present, the most concern for us is housing...it would be ranked lower
if we rent...though we have (transformed) Shenzhen hukou...” (SZ-1st
interviewee).
“...there is a ranking system in public schools...as I know, students with
Shenzhen hukou and parents having own housing are prioritized...then the
opportunities goes to those without Shenzhen hukou but with own
housing...” (SZ-8th interviewee).
“...based on my experience, students with only having Shenzhen hukou but
the families do not have own commercial housing are still ranked behind
others with both or housing only...” (SZ-10th interviewee).
“...the regulation is that students can access public compulsory education as
long as their parents bought a flat...” (SZ-11th interviewee).
“...only having Shenzhen hukou cannot secure a place in public schools,
which may be the third priority...and chance of going to public schools is
lower than those with housing only...” (SZ-12th interviewee).
Apparently, the Shenzhen government creates a loose policy context in practices
of hukou conversion, which certainly increases the chance of migrants in terms of
being admitted by public schools. However, in consideration of practices of
admission in public schools, housing has been a more influential factor determining
the chance of accessing public education in Shenzhen. In view of the latest report,
the average monthly income in Shenzhen was about 10,477 yuan (Tencent News,
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2020). In 2019, the average commercial housing price in Shenzhen is 65,516 yuan
per square meter, which increased by 8.65 per cent and was ranked top in China
(Tencent News, 2020). As a result, grassroots migrants cannot afford the amount of
housing expenses in the city, which seems to be a astronomical figure for
“wage-earners”. Therefore accessing public education is still inaccessible for many
non-local residents in Shenzhen, despite many have transformed hukou status and
hold Shenzhen hukou.
This section details the the public perceptions on IEO. In the following section, a
set of discussions provide more reflective and conclusive reflections on the issue.
5.2 Reflective Discussions
This section comprises two discussion clusters. First, a dual-polarization model
is formed according to the researcher’s own reflections on the detailed differentiation
in financing and regulation of the two research sites, which indicates the value of the
comparative study. Second, the conceptual framework of the research is developed to
provide emerging viewpoints regarding the IEO and decentralization reforms in the
hukou system, which highlights the contributions of this research to the literature.
5.2.1 A Dual-polarization Model
Decentralization tactics impart a higher degree of autonomy to local
governments in making and practising policies. As a consequence, a national policy
framework can be conducted very differently by different local authorities insomuch
as differentiation of local circumstances. China is a huge and diverse country. In the
case of the hukou system, the central government, as the aforementioned discourses,
has been executing an institutionalized doctrine of decentralization over the decades,
which irritates local governments to make appropriate policies so that the
performance of managing local affairs can become efficient and effective. The results
of analyzing the data that were generated from the information shared by the group
of interviewees certainly present such differentiation in how the two local
governments utilize the hukou system, along with administrative decentralization, to
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manage the admission practices of basic education for migrant students. This section,
as the chapter’s outset, unfurls a general description and inducts detailed
comparisons in the two thematic analysis.
For the reason of explicating the degree of differentiation, the following figure is
used to present the interviewees’ perceptions on the degree of difficulty of getting
into compulsory education in the two cities in general.

Shenzhen

s
difficult

easy
Beijing

Figure 5.4 A dual-polarization model: general perceptions of the interviewees on the
degree of difficulty of gaining basic education in Beijing and Shenzhen.
Note: the distance between the curved line and horizontal line represents the number
of the interviewees; the distance (s) getting bigger means that more interviewees feel
in that way.
Source: author’s own work.

The Figure 5.3 indicates how the interviewees of the two cities “feel”, “think”,
“perceive” the opportunities of accessing basic education. Alternatively, how difficult
gaining education for migrant students the interviewees think is, generally. This
research was not implemented by questionnaires and the sample size is not as rich as
quantitative studies, but information shared by the interviewees is still able to tell the
researcher a general pattern describing the “feelings” of migrants regarding the
degree of difficulty of gaining basic education.
Each interview conversation was kicked out with two general questions: how do
you describe IEO, and whether unequal circumstances in education opportunities tail
77

away? Setting up the two questions was to collect general and firsthand feelings of
the interviewees on how they think the educational environment of migrant students
from the respective of equality/inequality of opportunities. The word, “opportunities”,
means the chance of accessing and gaining compulsory/basic education by migrant
students without local hukou. By asking the two questions that can be answered with
the first impression based on personal experiences, the status quo of IEO in the two
cities were emerged, which indicates differentiation comparatively and grounds the
comparisons in financing and regulation matters.
For those living in Beijing, the hukou status as a key social indicator for Chinese
deeply affects the opportunities of gaining public education by migrant students (Liu
& Jacob, 2013). In this regard, the results of this research not only echoes the
argument in literature, but also indicates that IEO has not been resolved but become
even worse over the years. The IEO problems are further stretched into the process of
schooling. When discussing the education situation of migrant students, there is a
message from an interview described as:
“...IEO has not been resolved at all...previously, non-local students still were
able to continue their studies till secondary and high schools as long as they
were admitted, but at present teachers may ask these students to leave to
hometown (place of hukou registration) in primary schools after they are
admitted...which is really afflicting and alarming...” (BJ-1st interviewee).
Based on the stipulation in Beijing, the “local-first” rule applied to educational
matters is understood owing to “...elitism and limitation of resources...” and “...a fast
growing population over the past decades...” (BJ-3rd interviewee). However “...the
“local-first” rule ought to be set in admission only, and it cannot influence students
who are admitted...it becomes discrimination against migrants when the rule works
in the process of schooling, when teachers would decide where students need to
move to for further education...” (BJ-1st interviewee).
What can peek is that IEO troubles migrant students in Beijing from admission
to learning procedures in public schools due to various practical reasons. Comparing
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to public education, going to private schools is much financially challenging for
migrant families. The following information shared by an interviewee indicates a
“black-case work”:
“...choosing private schools is all bout money, not only for tuition fees that
can be as high as 200,000 yuan per year, but also the ‘sponsorship packages’
that usually cost 100,000 to 200,000 yuan...the ‘sponsorship packages’ are
paid once if you are looking for private schools...apart from the
‘sponsorship packages’, if you have no relation in some good private
schools, you need look for ‘agents’, in the way it is needed to pay
‘intermediary fee’...” (BJ-9th interviewee).
Straightforwardly, an interviewee (BJ-2nd) indicated the same worry: “...private
education brings about huge financial burdens to families, particularly the grassroots
like us...” A dilemma of IEO is formed in Beijing where going to public schools
becomes little possible owing to the “local-first” rule, while choosing private schools
could be a financial “catastrophe” that grassroots migrant families cannot bear,
according to the messages of the interviewees.
In Shenzhen, the context is praised by the interviewees in general. In literature,
fewer studies explored IEO in the first SEZ of China. As what mentioned, this could
be a result of its population structure and philosophy of urban development, which is
consented in its inclusiveness. This research designed as a comparative study
believes it is worth comparing two cities with different development models, which
can depict an intact picture and penetrate into deep and unknown areas so that some
of emerging implications can come up and bring into the literature with new
reflective perspectives. The results of analyzing data coming from Shenzhen
certainly echo the intention.
Overall, how the interviewees “feel” IEO in Shenzhen? The following messages
represent the majority of interviewees’ responses.
“...educational situation for migrant students become better eventually...”
(SZ-2nd interviewee).
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“...the chance for migrant students to access compulsory education becomes
more possible...relevant polices become better as well...” (SZ-3rd
interviewee).
“...I think the government makes lots of efforts on basic education...they
enhance the educational possibility for migrant students through
policymaking and enlarging schooling quota...” (SZ-5th interviewee).
“...previously, hukou was a restriction to get into public schools, but now as
long as you have ‘residence permit’, it is not that difficult go to public
schools...” (SZ-8th interviewee).
Except differentiation of the difficulty and possibility of accessing public
schools, what is vastly different from migrant perceptions from Beijing, who are
encountering potential financial “traps” in any forms of “black-case work”, is that
students studying in private schools in Shenzhen have subsidies, and such a subsidy
can cover tuition fees at certain degree. This financially eases the differentiation
between public and private education
“...subsidies from the government are applied to both local and non-local
students in private schools...the rate may be different...local students can
apply for a higher rate of subsidy in an easier way though... at least,
non-local students are included...the subsidy enables many children afford
private education...” (SZ-3rd interviewee).
“...as I know, the subsidy is around 4,000 yuan per term...compared to the
tuition fees in private schools, the amount is not huge. But having subsidy is
better than no subsidy...” (SZ-11th interviewee).
Thereupon, in view of how the interviewees feel IEO problems and the current
situation of compulsory education for migrant students, the general implications from
the two cities are revealed in polarized difference. In Beijing, not only are restrictions
strengthened, but also financial burdens are brought in for grassroots migrant
families. While in Shenzhen, the two aspects are praised by the most of interviewees.
From a macro perspective, more interviewees from Beijing hold passive attitudes
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towards the educational prospect of their children and take thought for IEO.
In financing, the two local governments implement policies completely different
to private education. In Beijing, there is no policy indicating for individual financial
assistance for migrants in private schools, despite there is a limited amount of “living
subsidy”. Besides, “sponsorship packages” and “intermediary fees” further block the
path of grassroots migrant students to access private education. In the same respect,
the Shenzhen government has policies that are welcomed and implemented
effectively. To some extend, financial assistance to migrant students could cover
private education expenses, which equalizes educational opportunities by easing the
difference between private and public education.
In regulation, in consideration of policy weightiness and relativity in comparison,
this research sheds light on the PBS which is functioning in both cities. In Beijing,
the PBS, officially described as the “4+2+7” policy framework also, determines
migrant students in choosing public education, alongside the “local-first” rule. The
distinction between “eligibility” and “possibility” in practices of hukou conversion
becomes more evident. This pares down migrants’ expectation in choosing public
education by turning non-local hukou into Beijing hukou. Comparatively, although
Shenzhen’s PBS assist migrants in having local hukou with the much higher degree
of “possibility”, at present, having Shenzhen hukou for the majority of non-local
students from working class families cannot secure a place in public schools, as a
confounding factor - housing status - emerges and is weighted in admission practices
within public schools. As a consequence, public education cannot be equally
guaranteed for migrant students in Shenzhen, although the “possibility” of going
public education by replying on hukou conversion or status is higher than those in
Beijing.
In short, the feelings of migrants in IEO in the two cities differ. In practice, the
distinction exists and becomes evident in financing perspective, which links to
private education. When referring to public education, migrant students are
encountering IEO issues for various reasons under different policy frameworks in
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Beijing and Shenzhen.
5.2.2 A Developed Conceptual Framework
The Figure 3.2 presents the focused point linked to the literature debate and
theoretically backs up the empirical discourses of this research. The theoretical
implication generated in the framework links to an inquiry: whether decentralization
tactics of financing and regulation in education governance reverse the “better-off”
and “worse-off” context. In consideration of the study findings, this inquiry related to
the conceptual framework can be explained in the following Figure 5.4.

A “Better-off” and “Worse-off” education context

Decentralization
Tactics in Education
Governance,
alongside
Decentralization
Reforms in the Hukou
System

Financing
Beijing: negative (-)

Shenzhen: positive (+)
Homeownership

Regulation
Beijing: negative (-)

Shenzhen: positive (+)

Figure 5.5 A developed conceptual framework.
Source: author’s own work.

IEO presents different paradigms of settlements in the two cities. In light of the
aforementioned section with reflections on the research questions, what can be
argued is that, taking into account of the two thematic analytical perspectives,
policies have not reversed the “better-off” and “worse-off” situation but
institutionalized IEO in Beijing. Shenzhen displays an opposite case amid the trend
of decentralization tactics in education governance and decentralization of hukou
system. The Shenzhen government makes, implements and employs policies to
equalize educational opportunities for migrant students. Yet as what Chapter 2
discussed, educational uncertainty rises as housing status has emerged as a
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confounding factor in admission practices for public education, which concretes the
“better-off” and “worse-off” situation at certain degree.
This developed conceptual framework visualizes the critical findings by
referring to the conceptual framework proposed in the Chapter 3. As to the central
inquiry on whether decentralization can reverse the better-off and worse-off context
in education for migrant students, this developed conceptual framework provides
viewpoints in the two cities from the two forms of decentralization practices:
financing and regulation. In consideration of the literature debate on the effectiveness
of decentralization, the study cases of this research illustrates that it is irrational to
simplify the argument on the inquiry as different policies can have different impacts.
But what can be argued is that, as a typical socialist state, China and its major cities
own the imbalanced social system that is embodied in different social activities such
as education, and migrants, especially those from lower social class, are marginalized
in accessing public services. In China, this is mainly a result of the hukou system,
despite the Chinese government is reforming it into a more equal institution.
In summary, the conceptual framework that inducts the theoretical inquiry assists
the process of data collection and analysis by pulling the focused point onto the
policy examination so as to scrutinize the effectiveness of decentralization in the
study case. By developing the conceptual framework, the major research findings are
theorized into the dual-polarization model that indicates the differentiation of the
study cases and highlights the value of the comparative study. More specific, on the
two analytical perspectives, what the major findings can tell is:
1) In terms of financing, the vacuum of subsidy policy and additional
sponsorship costs worsen the context of educational access for migrants in Beijing,
comparatively, the Shenzhen government implements welcomed social policies for
migrant students in private schools, which indeed dismantles the separation between
public and private education, and financially equalizes educational opportunities;
2) In terms of regulation, accessing public education by hukou conversion is
more practicable for migrant students in Shenzhen than its counterpart. Nonetheless,
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housing status or ownership has sprung as a crucial referred metric in Shenzhen
when taking into account of public schools admission for migrant students, which
vitiates policies and regulations within hukou conversion practices.
This comparison from the two prevailing discourse in decentralization provide
solid and emerging observations for develop the understandings on the effectiveness
of decentralization in developed regions. In the following chapter, conclusive
remarks are made, which summarizes the thesis by revisiting the research objectives
and questions with further reflections on major findings, contributions and
limitations as well as future research plans.
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Chapter 6 CONCLUSIONS
This chapter draws conclusion for the thesis and contains three parts. First, in
light of the key findings, the answers of the research questions and the responses to
the research objective are discussed. Second, the contributions and limitations of this
research and a future research plan are uncovered. Third, the final remarks indicate
the general reflections on this research.
6.1 Reflections on the Major Findings
Of the first research question, under the context of hukou decentralization, what
are policies conceived by the local governments to manage educational opportunities
for migrant students in Beijing and Shenzhen? This research reviewed
comprehensively the major policies that impact on the education admission practices
in these two cities.
First, from the financing analytical perspective, there are few necessary subsidy
policies made by the Beijing government, despite the amount-limited living subsidy
scheme. By contrast, the Shenzhen government makes a bunch of financial assistance
policies aiming at not only local but non-local students.
Second, from the regulation analytical perspective, the major policies of these
two cities in managing educational admission practices is related to hukou
conversion. In this regard, the Beijing’s “4+2+7” framework tends to exclude more
non-local residents in light of a higher eligibility level. Comparatively, Shenzhen’s
“PBS” scheme relaxes the requirement of changing non-local hukou into local hukou.
As same as the financing, these two cities implement different policies to manage
educational admission through regulation.
Of the second research question which is the primary inquiry of this study: how
effective these policies are in equalizing educational opportunities for migrant
students in these two cities? The findings also provided explicit answers.
As what indicated in the dual-polarization model, the integrated inquiry of the
conceptual framework is whether decentralization tactics can reverse the “better-off”
and “worse-off” education context through specific policies. First, migrant students
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in Beijing cannot foresee the turning point due to the shortage of financing assistance
policies and the regulatory strictness in hukou conversion. The former one frightens
the lower social class in accessing private education, and the latter one blocks the
chance of accessing public education by migrant students. Second, migrant students
in Shenzhen are more fortunate as the Shenzhen government not only provides
financial assistance for those in private education but also eases the requirement for
hukou conversion in accessing public education. But, as the status of homeownership
emerges as the critical reference metric to access public education, the relaxation of
hukou conversion seems less important than expectation to determine the opportunity
of public education, which certainly weakens the function of its PBS framework.
With reference to the answers of these research questions, the research objective,
to understand how hukou decentralization impacts on educational opportunities for
migrant students in Beijing and Shenzhen, China, was achieved by providing detailed
comparisons and uncovering the differentiation in these two research sites. In a word,
as the developed regions in China, and in terms of the policy contexts for education
access, migrants in Shenzhen have a more policy-friendly environment than their
counterparts in Beijing, although the housing costs and the weight of homeownership
status increasingly work on the opportunity of education access by migrant students.
6.2 Contributions, Limitations and Future Research Agendas
In the past decades, decentralization has emerged and been deemed as a popular
policy recommendation in, especially, developing countries, which, taking China as
an example, has been successfully demonstrated in economic advancements (Cai &
Treisman, 2006; Qian & Weingast, 1996; Rodriguez, 2006). By political, fiscal and
administrative decentralization, local governments are authorized fully in making,
implementing and revising policies to tally with in-situ circumstances (Rodriguez,
2006). What the theoretical literature on the subject summarizes is that the provision
of public services would be more effective, efficient and equitable if decentralization
reforms are successful (Rodriguez, 2006).
This research, referring to the cases of Beijing and Shenzhen, comparatively
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elucidates the effectiveness of hukou decentralization in equalizing education access
for migrant students in urban China. It is concluded that decentralization tactics in
the educational field make a little difference in equalize education access for migrant
students in Beijing, although hukou decentralization is advocated and implemented
as the basic reform within the social administration mechanism. As an exceptional
Chinese megacity with the unique economic development and social administration
models, hukou decentralization indeed produces a greater autonomy for the Shenzhen
government to make locality-suited policies to respond the increasingly educational
demands along with the increasing migrant population. These government efforts on
the basic education certainly benefits its citizens.
This research, from a comparative perspective, used comprehensive sociological
and public administrative theories to examine the classic policy issue in the Chinese
society, hukou. There are large numbers of studies in literature articulating hukou and
its link and influence with IEO issues, among which migrants used to be at the front
of argumentation and discussions (e.g. Ma & Wu, 2019; Qian & Qian, 2017). In
addition, the debate on the effectiveness of decentralization has not been suspended
in literature in the past. Not only do the debates come to the forms of decentralization,
but also the geographical divisions emerge up (e.g. Davoodi & Zou, 1998; Litvack,
Ahmad & Bird, 1998). The majority of these studies used to focus on decentralized
practices in a particular type of public policy fields, such as fiscal. Regarding the
administrative or policy making or implementing decentralization, the literature lacks
rich discussions to explain different cases.
In light of the literature lacuua, this research can contribute literature through the
empirical experiments in the following points. First, in view of most of studies
discoursing the hukou system and IEO either from a single case, which tends to refer
to empirical methods, or from a national level, which replies on secondary databases,
few studies adopt a comparative perspective to review the hukou system and its
impact on IEO for migrant students. Second, this research contains Shenzhen, an
unique study case on the hukou system and IEO in China context, and provides an
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emerging perspective of understanding to the immigration city. Third, in terms of the
theoretical debate on the effectiveness of decentralization in developed regions,
which is the blasting fuse of the study inquiries, this research contributes the
literature by integrating the China cases. Specifically, whether developed regions
likely record effective performance in decentralization practices, this research argues
that economic development may not be the unique reference index to make the final
conclusion. In fact, there are numerous factors to be concerned by local governments,
including demographic features, economic contexts, and political objectives. Besides,
the relationship between the central and local governments further complicates
policy-makings and implementations at locales in the country.
Basic education as one of key public services areas directly indicates governance
performance amid decentralization reforms. In light of local circumstances, it is
understandable that policies made are different in different cities under the context of
decentralization. As shown by this research, although both study cases are developed
regions, policies made for education access by migrant students are completely
different. As argued, the Beijing case evidences that the capital city still implements
socialist policies towards public services distribution. While the Shenzhen
government tends to make policies from the perspective of capitalist liberalism and
inclusion. In the mean time, the role of the central government cannot be ignored in
the process of decentralization. As a socialist state, the central government owns the
full power to grandly revise decentralization practices, which fundamental influences
social affairs in the dynamic reforming process, such as the surge of centralized
decentralization in the wide spectrum of public policies in China in the last few years.
Therefore, studying China case at the strand of decentralization needs to consider the
role of the central government and the central-local relationship. This perspective can
be added in the further research agenda under the topic of IEO and migrant students
in the context of hukou decentralization in urban China.
There are some limitations of this research. For example, as the objective of
analysis of the study simply refers to the grassroots (working class/proletariat), the
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research findings and implications cannot be applied to discourse educational issues
for non-lower social class. Furthermore, educational inequality is circumscribed into
the admission practice in this research, and the other two respects of educational
inequality (process and outcome) are excluded. The findings and observations, hence,
cannot expound whether and how inequality impacts on migrant students in terms of
being educated, alongside the decentralization trend and reforms in the hukou system
and educational institutions. In consideration of the limitations, it is imperative to
conduct further studies with a wider spectrum and focusing on the other two forms of
educational inequality. Thus an integrated study series referring to other social class
and links to educational inequality issues at various stages of schooling would be
capable of comprehending relevant policies in effectiveness and efficiency.
Specifically, the further research agenda can contain two research direction, one
refers to a wider spectrum by including missing components of this issue, such as the
non-lower social class and the other two forms of educational inequality, namely,
schooling process and outcome. The other can be extended to inquire more deeply
regarding the policymaking and implementation fairly by taking into account of the
the central-local relationship. Along with the completion of these two future research
plans (horizontal and vertical), an integrate case study will be capable of setting out a
comprehensive policy review from the perspective of hukou decentralization
6.3 Final Remarks
The hukou system yields a bunch of social policies in China and impacts on the
livelihood of people in education, employment, medicare and housing. Various layers
of Chinese governments make policies on the basis of local circumstances to better
off social and economic contexts, which implies the popularity of decentralization at
local governance. Owing to the unbalanced regional development, migration brings
different consequences to the cities in the country. Those with immigration encounter
the deficit of social resources as a result of growing inner competitions, while others
with emigration are trapped by the deficit of professionals and labor force for social
and economic advancements. It is not rational to argue that decentralization is not an
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effective administrative approach in China by just referring to several cases. But
what should be noted is that decentralization seems not be a golden rule that must be
able to create a better governance model, in the respect of the basic livelihood of
people, such as education. By contrast, governance models can be mixed by adopting
the strategies of centralization, re-centralization and decentralization. This further
inducts the flabby flexibility and lack of dynamism of making and implementing
policies in the political regime of China, which has been a defect of the one-party
bureaucracy (e.g. Cai, 2008; White, 1987).
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APPENDIX
Research Informed Consent
“Decentralization of Hukou System and Its Impact on Educational opportunities for
Migrant Students”
Dear participant,
Thank you and I am Li Bo, postgraduate student from Hong Kong’s Lingnan
University, Department of Sociology and Social Policy. I am conducting a research
on “Hukou Decentralization and Migrant Students’ Educational Opportunities”, and
the main purpose of this research is to investigate how social policies alongside
decentralization administration in Beijing and Shenzhen impact on educational
opportunities for migrant students. Taking this opportunities, I would like to invite
you as a participant in this research.
If you agree to participate in the research activities, you will be interviewed by
me in a semi-structured manner. The interview is to be conducted once or twice.
Each interview is to be proceeded in 30 to 40 minutes. The first round of interview
will be conducted in October and November 2019. If there is any missing
information, we will proceed with the second round that is planned in December
2019 to January 2020. The manner of communication will be “face-to-face”,
“phone-call” or “social media”.
Interview will exclude personal privacy (e.g. name, age and gender), and the
voluntary principle will be a grounded rule for interviewing activities in any time and
at any stage. You will have absolute right to retreat for any kind of personal reasons.
In the meantime, you will be given absolute right to look into recorded materials and
point out untrue or inappropriate parts that would need to be deleted. All information
and data will be exclusively used for academic purposes (e.g. academic presentations,
conferences and journals). In order to ensure the precision, audio-record will be used
in interview.
This research excludes any sensitive or illegal topics, and will not make you feel
uncomfortable. Raw materials will not be shared with any third party and deleted
immediately after the research.
If you would like to participate, please contact me (email: boli3@ln.hk; phone:
15296632844). If you have any query on the research ethical issues, please feel free
to contact the Office of Research Support (email: ors@ln.edu.hk) of Lingnan
University.
I look forward to welcoming you and your valuable advice to this research!
Yours sincerely.
Li Bo
MPhil Candidate
Department of Sociology and Social Policy
Lingnan University, Hong Kong
October 2019
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研究知情书
“分散化的户籍制度及其对移民学生平等教育机会获得的影响”

阁下：
您好！
我是岭南大学（香港）社会学及社会政策系社会政策专业硕士研究生，现正做一项课
题为“分散化的户籍制度及其对移民学生平等教育机会获得的影响”的研究。该研究主要
目的是为了解在户籍制度分散化的背景下，地方政府推出的相关政策是否提高了移民（外
来/非本地）学生公平接受义务教育的机会。
若阁下同意参加此项研究，我将以“半结构化/深度”访谈的形式和阁下进行交流。该
访谈将进行 1-2 次，第一次访谈预计持续 30-40 分钟，第二次访谈（若需要）预计持续
10-15 分钟。第一次的访谈会在 2019 年 10 月到 11 月展开。若在第一次访谈之后存在“因
本人原因或其他技术性障碍，不完全理解表述内容”的情况，可能会进行第二次的访谈。
第二次访谈（若需要）将会在 2019 年 12 月到 2020 年 1 月之间进行。访谈将会以“面对
面”或者“电话”和“社交网络”的形式进行。
该访谈不涉及个人信息（包括：姓名/性别/年龄），并且属于自愿性质，阁下享受充
分的权力随时中止并退出访谈。同时，阁下有权查阅所有访谈资料，并删除阁下认为不合
适或不相关的信息。所有与访谈有关的资料及编码仅用于该研究（包括：教育类演讲/学术
会议/期刊文章）。为提高数据收集准确性，访谈全程会进行录音。
此项研究不包含任何敏感或者违法话题，亦不会对阁下造成任何不适。原始访谈资料
不会被分享，并且将在研究结束时被删除。
若阁下对参与该研究有意，请与我联系（电邮：boli3@ln.hk; 电话：15296632844）。
此外，若阁下对这项研究的伦理道德有任何意见或想了解更多相关信息，请与岭南大学（香
港）研究事务处联系（电话：852-26167688；电邮：ors@ln.edu.hk）。
期待阁下的参与！衷心感谢阁下宝贵的时间！

李博
社会政策硕士研究生
社会学及社会政策系
岭南大学（香港）
2019 年 10 月
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访谈问题

Interview Questions
1. 请用两个或三个词来描述您是如何理解“不平等的教育机会”。

Please use two or three words to describe “inequality of educational opportunities” .
2. 按照您的理解，您觉得教育机会不平等的现象是否在有所减少？请举例说明。

According to your perception, are unequal circumstances in educational
opportunities tailed away? Please indicate details.
3. 如果您孩子是本地户口，您觉得相比现在升学是否会更容易？请说明原因。

Whether it would be easier for your child to be enrolled into a school if he/she holds
a local hukou? Why?
4. 若有机会，您是否愿意为了孩子升学把户口转为本地户口？在这个户口转变的过程中您
觉得会有什么障碍？

Would you like to transfer the non-local hukou into local in consideration of child’s
education? What could be obstacles you can expect in the transition process?
5. 在您看来，政府是否为了扫除这些障碍都做了些尝试？若有，您觉得是否有效，为什么？

According to your experience, whether the government has put efforts to remove
these obstacles? If yes, do you think these efforts are effective, and why?
6. 您认为对，对于非本地户口学生来说，进入公立还是私立学校更容易？为什么？

Do you think going to public schools is easier or going to private ones is easier for
non-local hukou students? Why?
7. 影响您选择公立或是私立学校最主要的因素是以下三个的哪一个：招生政策的差异度；
学杂费用的差异度；师资质量差异度。请说明原因。

Which is the most considered factor influencing your decision on public or private
schools for your child: differentiation in admission policy, tuition expenditure, or
teaching quality? Please indicate your reasons.
8. 就学杂费用的差异度来看，您认为政府都做了哪些尝试去平衡公立和私立学校的发展，
比如政府补贴？您觉得这些尝试是否使得非本地户籍学生的教育机会的获得更加公平？为
什么？

From the perspective of differentiation in tuition expenditure, whether the
government tries to balance the development of public and private schools, such as
subsidy? If yes, whether these efforts make educational opportunities more equal for
non-local hukou students? What are your reasons?
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